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While countless studies demonstrate the complex and dangerous
nature of intimate partner abuse, most jurisdictions permit only the entry of
yearlong domestic violence protection orders. Judges may assume that danger
ceases once the order takes effect, but evidence of the recurrent nature of
violence demonstrates the importance of providing judicial protection over
time. The brevity of domestic violence protection orders stands in stark
contrast to the long duration of orders in other areas of the law, such as
intellectual property, corporations, real property, and tax, where courts
routinely enter permanent injunctions to protect individuals and businesses
against "irreparable harm." What explains this differential treatment? Why
would the law deny courts the ability to protect those who experience physical
and psychological harm at the hands of an intimate partner?
This Article is the first scholarship to identify and attempt to explain
the dichotomy between injunctive relief for domestic violence and other areas
of the law and to explore the potential for indefinite domestic violence
injunctions in normative depth. To establish the generally temporary nature of
domestic violence protection orders, the Article reports the results of a fifty-
state survey on protection order lengths and extension standards, a survey
undertaken for this piece. To explain the differential treatment of domestic
violence injunctions, the Article situates its analysis in the historic backdrop of
the state condoning domestic violence through the husband's right of
chastisement and the family privacy theory, ideologies now considered
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untenable. Recent decades have seen the ensuing struggle to develop the civil
protection order remedy in a continuing climate of family law exceptionalism.
In conducting a comparative analysis among areas of the law in which
permanent injunctions are commonplace, the Article applies to domestic
violence cases the equitable principles for permanent injunctions that the
Supreme Court recently announced as a four-factor test in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. The Article addresses potential due process concerns
and draws heavily on social science to demonstrate the harm of domestic
violence, physical and psychological dangers of returning to court, risk of
reengaging with an abusive partner year after year, efficacy of protection
orders, and inadequacy of other forms of relief. Abuse survivors come to court
seeking protection, but current statutory durations often prove inadequate,
and violence survivors merit the same protections readily available to property
and business interests. To harmonize domestic violence law with other areas
of the law, the Article proposes the nationwide availability of indefinite
domestic violence protection orders and a presumption that orders be at least
two years in duration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Susan's husband strangled her and beat her so severely that he
called 9-1-1 and said, "I think I've killed my wife."' Anna's boyfriend
held a gun to her and threatened her life. The father of Regina's
children liked to practice wrestling moves on her. He held Regina
upside down and dropped her onto the concrete floor in a "pile drive"
move, her head hitting the floor with the force of gravity and weight of
her body. Annette's ex-boyfriend came to her home, beat her, raped
her, and started a house fire. All of these women2 soon sought and
1. Clients' names have been changed and identifying information omitted. These
examples from my clients' lives represent only several of the countless instances of violence
beyond measure that are perpetrated against domestic violence survivors on a daily basis. See,
e.g., Green v. Green, 642 A.2d 1275, 1276-77 (D.C. 1994). In Green, when the petitioner was
eight months pregnant, her husband banged her head against a brick wall, kicked her in the
abdomen while threatening to kill her and their unborn baby, threw her down a flight of stairs,
and stabbed her sister, and these events were part of a history of violence. Id. Based on these
facts, the court issued a yearlong protection order and, prior to its expiration, extended the order
for an additional year. Id.
2. Recognizing that domestic violence occurs in same-sex relationships at the same rate as
in opposite-sex relationships, I have chosen to use gender-neutral pronouns throughout this
Article. See Joanna Bunker Rohrbaugh, Domestic Violence in Same-Gender Relationships, 44
2014] 1017
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received domestic violence civil protection orders3 that were in effect
for one year. Every year, each woman returns to court for another
adversarial proceeding to seek another year of protection. Courts have
already found the intimate partners described to be dangerous. This
year, however, when Annette requested that the court extend her
protection order beyond the initial year, the judge did so reluctantly
and warned her that she would not be able to return each year for
further renewals unless additional violence occurred.
The state's response to domestic violence is relatively recent.
Historically, courts vested husbands with the right of chastisement
over their wives, who were considered their property; courts later
characterized marriage as existing in a domain beyond law and in a
"sphere separate from civil society."4 Both the property approach and
the romantic notion of the companionate relationship, however, had
the effect of condoning domestic violence. This lack of governmental
response persisted until recent decades, when the criminal and civil
justice systems began responding to intimate partner violence. From
1970 to 1993, state legislatures created special laws and proceedings
FAM. CT. REV. 287, 287 (2006) ("Initial research suggests that violence occurs at the same rate
(12-50%) in same-gender couples as it does in cross-gender couples .... ). The case examples in
the Introduction, however, concern female clients, which is consistent with the fact that women
are much more likely than men to be victimized by an intimate partner. See MATTHEW R.
DUNROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS 1 (2005) (finding that
approximately eighty-five percent of victims of intimate partner abuse are female); see also
LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF
DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS 3 (1998)
(finding that women are eight times more likely than men to be victimized by an intimate
partner). The majority of social science research examines women who have been abused by men,
and in a quest to have our laws respond to survivors' needs and lived experiences, this Article
draws heavily on social science research.
3. Depending on the state, civil protection orders may also be known as restraining
orders, protective orders, orders of protection, or injunctions. For consistency, the term
"protection order" is used throughout this Article. Upon the petitioner proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the respondent committed domestic violence against the
petitioner, the court may award a civil protection order. Such orders may prohibit the respondent
from contacting, coming near, assaulting, harassing, or stalking the petitioner; award child
custody, visitation, and possession of property and pets; and order the respondent to vacate a
shared residence and attend counseling, among other relief. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1001 to
1005 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010-.060 (West 2012). Some jurisdictions permit
courts to award child support and spousal support. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6341 (West 2013):
[The court may, if requested by the petitioner, order a party to pay an amount
necessary for the support and maintenance of the child.. . If the parties are married
to each other and no spousal support order exists, after notice and a hearing, the court
may order the respondent o pay spousal support ....
4. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love"- Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2167-68 (1996).
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for domestic violence protection orders,5 a type of injunction intended
to intervene in abusive relationships and prevent further violence.6
The Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection
Orders Act defines "protection orders" as injunctions issued by a court
under the domestic violence, family violence, or anti-stalking laws of
the issuing state to prevent an individual from engaging in violent or
threatening acts, harassment, contact, communication, or physical
proximity to another person.7 Protection orders are now the most
widely used legal remedy against domestic violence, with more
survivors utilizing this civil justice system remedy than seeking tort
remedies or having involvement with the criminal justice system.8
Domestic violence survivors apply for civil protection orders in
pursuit of safety. Many of these individuals have experienced high
5. LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A SURVIVOR-
CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 33 (2008).
6. See MacDonald v. State, 997 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (relying on the
state civil rules that govern injunctions and restraining orders, rather than looking broadly to
general rules governing service of process, in determining whether the defendant had adequate
notice of a protection order); Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 929, 929-30, 930 n.3 (D.C. 1991)
(applying federal principles regarding injunctions to a protection order extension case and
explaining, "This is the normal standard in civil cases, and we see no reason to apply a different
one here"); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 821 N.E.2d 79, 87 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (identifying select
published opinions in which states handle domestic violence protection orders in the same
manner as other civil injunctions, and citing cases which describe protection orders as a "form" or
"species" of injunction); Sjomeling v. Stuber, 615 N.W.2d 613, 616 (S.D. 2000) (recognizing that
domestic violence protection orders are a type of injunction and using traditional rules of
injunctions and rules of civil procedure to determine the standard for modifying domestic
violence protection orders); State ex rel. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d 298, 304 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2007) (stating that protection orders are in the nature of civil injunctions); see also Emily J.
Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congressional
Power, and Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 827, 855 (2004)
(identifying domestic violence protection orders as "injunctions"); Hallie Bongar White et al.,
Creative Remedies Against Non-Indian Offenders in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 427, 442
(2008) (noting that protection orders are a common example of an injunction).
7. UNIF. INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROT. ORDERS ACT § 2
(2002).
8. TK Logan & Robert Walker, Civil Protection Order Outcomes: Violations and
Perceptions of Effectiveness, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 675, 685 (2009); see also Sally F.
Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the
Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1489 (2008) (noting that civil
protection orders are the "most commonly used legal remedy for domestic violence"); Victoria
Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders and Risk of Subsequent Police-Reported Violence, 288 JAMA
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 589, 589 (2002) (finding that each year, approximately twenty percent of the 1.5
million victims of domestic violence obtain civil protection orders); Susan Keilitz, Improving
Judicial System Responses to Domestic Violence: The Promises and Risks of Integrated Case
Management and Technology Solutions, in HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION
STRATEGIES: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND LEGAL REMEDIES 147, 149 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002)
(finding that domestic abuse survivors are more likely to seek protection from violence solely
through civil protection orders, as compared with using the criminal justice system).
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levels of violence. They have been punched, choked, beaten, kicked,
burned, set on fire, and raped.9 They have suffered emotional,
psychological, and economic harm, and have been threatened with
weapons and words promising lethality.0 Rather than these being
isolated incidents, as with stranger violence, the abusive partner
targets the victim, and the abuser's efforts to exert power and control
over the survivor pervade the survivor's experience." Abuse is
recurrent and typically escalates in frequency and severity over
time,12 with past intimate partner violence being the "best predictor of
9. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 41 (D.C. 1993) (reporting that the
petitioner sought a civil protection order because her husband beat her with his hands, a belt,
and a thick cable; threatened her with a gun; and used other physical force that, on separate
occasions, caused her to lose consciousness and require hospitalization); Michelle J. Anderson,
Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A New Law on Sexual
Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1510 (2003) (arguing against marital immunity for
sexual offenses and providing graphic examples of the violence of marital rape); Deborah
Epstein, Fighting Domestic Violence in the Nation's Capital, 3 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 93,
94 (1995) (recounting the story of a young mother whose boyfriend burned her arm with a hot
iron).
10. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 829-30 (9th Cir. 2003) (establishing that
Ms. Hernandez suffered "extreme cruelty" in the United States because the cycle of violence
occurred while she was in America, and recounting the physical and psychological violence she
experienced while living in Mexico, which included her husband breaking objects across her head
and back, hitting and kicking her, lifting her by her hair, throwing her body, and threatening to
kill her); JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSES 10 (1999) (describing the powerful dynamics of "social entrapment" that characterize
many battering experiences, including the social isolation and fear caused by the abuse; the
indifference of powerful institutions to intimate partner violence; and the ways in which an
abuser's coercive control is aggravated by structural inequalities of racism, gender, and class).
11. See Amanda Hitt & Lynn McLain, Stop the Killing: Potential Courtroom Use of a
Questionnaire that Predicts the Likelihood that a Victim of Intimate Partner Violence Will Be
Murdered by Her Partner, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 277, 306 (2009) (describing the "chronic"
nature of intimate partner abuse, high rates of recidivism, and the typical domestic violence
pattern of a series of crimes perpetrated against the same victim); see also Myrna S. Raeder,
Being Heard After Giles: Comments on The Sound of Silence, 87 TEX. L. REV. 105, 111 (2009)
(characterizing physical violence as instrumental to the abuser's goal of controlling the victim's
life, rather than constituting the goal itself).
12. See, e.g., NORA K. PUFFETT & CHANDRA GAVIN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION,
PREDICTORS OF PROGRAM OUTCOME AND RECIDIVISM AT THE BRONX MISDEMEANOR DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE COURT 2 (2004), available at http://perma.cc/AV8D-HFFL (finding the re-arrest rate
for domestic violence offenders in New York to be sixty-two percent, which only accounts for a
small percentage of domestic violence due to underreporting); Marie L. Crandall et al., Predicting
Future Injury Among Women in Abusive Relationships, 56 J. TRAUMA-INJURY INFECTION &
CRITICAL CARE 906, 906 (2004) (finding that forty-four percent of women who were murdered by
their intimate partner had received emergency room treatment within two years of the homicide
and that nearly all had at least one emergency room visit for domestic violence injuries); Jane
Koziol-McLain et al., Predictive Validity of a Screen for Partner Violence Against Women, 21 AM.
J. PREVENTIVE MED. 93, 97-99 (2001) (finding that women who have experienced past intimate
partner violence are at "heightened risk" for continuing violence, a conclusion that is consistent
with the "well-known pattern of repeated abuse that many women endure"); Jeffrey Sonis &
Michelle Langer, Risk and Protective Factors for Recurrent Intimate Partner Violence in a Cohort
1020
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future violence."13 A survivor, thus, is often unable to feel secure at
home, the supposedly safest place in the world.
The protection order remedy has proven to be highly effective
in preventing future violence,14 but in most states, this remedy is only
available for one year or for a similarly limited duration.15 If an
abusive partner threatens to kill an intimate partner, will that danger
terminate when the yearlong domestic violence protection order
expires? The legal construction suggests that it does, but social science
data and the lived experiences of domestic violence survivors prove
otherwise. At the end of the year, petitioners may generally seek the
extension of the order through a motion and adversarial hearing.16
Some jurisdictions permit only one brief extension,'7 while others
require violence or threats to have occurred during the duration of the
order18 rather than interpreting the absence of violence as proof of the
court order's effectiveness and reason for it to remain in place. Given
the persistent and potentially fatal nature of domestic violence,
granting judicial protection in the form of indefinite protection orders
could increase survivors' safety and autonomy while saving them from
of Low-Income Inner-City Women, 23 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 529, 535 (2008) ("Frequency of [intimate
partner violence] incidents in the year prior to the baseline interview strongly increased the odds
of any recurrent [intimate partner violence].").
13. Daniel Jay Sonkin & William Fazio, Domestic Violence Expert Testimony in the
Prosecution of Male Batterers, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 218, 222 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987); see also Lauren
Bennett Cattaneo & Lisa A. Goodman, Risk Factors for Reabuse in Intimate Partner Violence: A
Cross-Disciplinary Critical Review, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 141, 166 (2005) (finding that a
history of physical abuse in a relationship is a strong predictor of reabuse, while the severity of
the particular offense that brought the batterer into the system does not appear to be an
important predictor, although many systems focus only on the most recent incident); Debra
Houry et al., A Positive Domestic Violence Screen Predicts Future Domestic Violence, 19 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 955, 962 (2004) (finding that, in a study to determine whether a
Partner Violence Screen would predict whether domestic violence would occur during the
following four months, the question, "Have you been hit, kicked, punched, or otherwise hurt by
someone in the past year?" was an extremely accurate predictor of future violence).
14. See infra Part VI.B.2 (explaining the effectiveness of protective orders).
15. See infra Part V.A (explaining that protective orders in most states have a limited
duration of typically only one year).
16. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (2013) ("A protection order issued pursuant to this
section shall be effective for such period up to one year as the judicial officer may specify, but the
judicial officer may, upon motion of any party to the original proceeding, extend, rescind, or
modify the order for good cause shown.").
17. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(c) (West 2013) (permitting only one six-month
extension).
18. See, e.g., id. (allowing for a six-month extension of the original yearlong order only
"after the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence has occurred
since the entry of the order, a violation of the order has occurred, if the respondent consents to
the extension of the order or for good cause shown").
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having to reengage with an abusive partner each year, which poses
substantial safety risks.19
The brief timeframe for orders regarding human safety can be
juxtaposed with long-term or truly permanent injunctions issued in
many other areas of the law to prevent "irreparable harm" to property,
copyrights, trademarks, employment, and other tax and business
interests.20 These readily available indefinite orders stand in stark
contrast to the short-lived domestic violence orders that are supposed
to prevent bodily harm. Given the historic lack of response to domestic
violence, the differential and exceptional treatment of domestic
violence is not surprising. Short-term statutory injunctions against
domestic violence problematically give the appearance of remedying
domestic abuse while permitting domestic violence to continue. This is
a form of what Reva Siegel has termed "preservation through
transformation,"21 in which legal change gives the appearance of
correcting a wrong but, in fact, perpetuates the status quo.
This Article begins by describing the dangerous, recurrent, and
escalating nature of domestic violence to illustrate why a longer
duration for domestic violence protection orders is generally desirable.
Part II utilizes social science research to describe the dynamics of
domestic violence, including the increased violence at the time of
separation, danger of appearing in court, and persistence of the abuser
in striving to maintain power and control over the survivor.
Part III discusses the legal standard for awarding permanent
injunctions in equity and identifies the many areas of the law in which
long-term or indefinite injunctions are commonplace. Part IV seeks to
reveal the basis for the law's differential treatment of domestic
violence. It situates the development of domestic violence protection
orders in historical context by describing how the state's response to
domestic violence evolved from the husband's right of chastisement
and correction, which permitted abuse as long as the husband did not
kill or maim his wife; to the family privacy theory, in which formal
19. See infra Part II (describing the ongoing nature of domestic violence and the danger
associated with frequent court dates).
20. See infra Part III (detailing the availability of permanent injunctions in other areas of
law).
21. Siegel, supra note 4, at 2119 ("When the legitimacy of a status regime is successfully
contested, lawmakers and jurists will both cede and defend status privileges-gradually
relinquishing the original rules and justificatory rhetoric of the contested regime and finding
new rules and reasons to protect such status privileges as they choose to defend."); see also Reva
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State
Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (1997) (identifying how "efforts to dismantle an entrenched
system of status regulation can produce changes in its constitutive rules and rhetoric,
transforming the status regime without abolishing it").
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and informal immunities allowed marital violence to persist; to the
relatively recent advent of laws prohibiting intimate partner abuse
and providing channels for court protection.
Part V analyzes the results of an original state-by-state survey
of statutes that was conducted for this Article. This section details the
limited time periods for domestic violence protection orders across the
United States and the periods for which orders may be extended.
Because injunctive relief is rooted in equity and most
injunctions are equitable, equitable principles illuminate what
matters in doing analysis for injunctive relief. Part VI describes both
the legal test for issuing permanent injunctions that the U.S. Supreme
Court announced in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 2 2 and the
standards used in state courts, and conducts a comparative analysis
between domestic violence cases and the equitable standards courts
apply in other legal contexts, such as commercial and property law.
While applying the general legal standards for issuing permanent
injunctions to the domestic violence context, the Article addresses
potential procedural and substantive due process concerns, concluding
that there is no rational justification for differential treatment that
manifests in allowing only short-term protection from domestic
violence.
Finally, Part VII proposes that indefinite domestic violence
protection orders be available across states and recommends a
national standard that orders have a minimum duration of two years.
The Article posits that domestic violence cases typically satisfy both
the statutory requirements for protection orders and the traditional
equitable principles for permanent injunctions; however, to expand
upon the current system in which each state has a statutory remedy
and many jurisdictions have specialized domestic violence courts, the
proposed remedy is statutory.
II. THE RECURRENT AND DANGEROUS NATURE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
An abuser's recurrent exertion of power and control over the
survivor pervades the survivor's experience, and without effective
intervention, battering typically escalates in frequency and severity
over time.23 The following sections describe the ongoing, dangerous
22. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
23. Jessica R. Goodkind et al., A Contextual Analysis of Battered Women's Safety Planning,
10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 514, 515 (2004) ("Once battering begins, it often escalates in
frequency and severity over time.").
2014] 1023
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nature of domestic violence and the unnecessary danger that frequent
court dates present.
A. Re-Victimization and Separation Assault
Domestic violence is different from other crimes in ways that
make past acts highly relevant and predictive of future danger.24
Intimate partner abuse rarely consists only of a single, isolated event;
instead, the abusive partner more commonly engages in an ongoing
process of violence and control.25 In fact, multiple studies have now
shown that past domestic violence is the best predictor of future
abuse.26 In comparison with victims of stranger violence, domestic
violence survivors are more likely to be reassaulted, experience more
severe levels of violence, and sustain worse injuries, such as knife
wounds and internal injuries.27 As violence escalates, the likelihood
that the perpetrator will use a weapon against the survivor also
increases,28 which dramatically increases the risk of lethality.29 The
dynamics of power and control, and the repetitive, escalating nature of
domestic violence distinguish intimate partner abuse from single-
incident stranger violence, which "continues to garner a
24. Supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; see also Kelly Rowe, The Limits of the
Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY
L.J. 855, 868 (1985) ("[A]s long as the batterer's underlying problem with violence is glossed over
or ignored it is almost inevitable that violence will recur.").
25. E.g., United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding defendant
guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm based on his conviction for a domestic violence crime
and noting, "The dangerous propensities of persons with a history of domestic abuse are no
secret, and the possibility of tragic encounters has been too often realized. We think it follows
that a person who is subject to such an order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences
of possessing a firearm, let alone of being apprehended with a handgun in the immediate vicinity
of his spouse."); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF
THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, at iii-iv
(2000).
26. Supra notes 12-13.
27. MICHAEL RAND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE-RELATED INJURIES TREATED IN
HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS 5-8 (1997) (reporting that among women treated for
domestic violence in emergency rooms, twenty-five percent are treated for serious stabs, cuts,
and internal injuries); Amy Sisley et al., Violence in America: A Public Health Crisis-Domestic
Violence, 46 J. TRAUMA 1105, 1105-12 (1999) (finding that fifty-two percent of domestic violence
survivors receive injuries when being physically assaulted, as compared to twenty percent of
victims of stranger assault, and measuring reassault over a six-month period).
28. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1155 (1993)
(citations omitted) ("[It is well documented that as domestic violence escalates, batterers often
begin using weapons against their victims.").
29. See Amy Karan & Helen Stampalia, Domestic Violence and Firearms: A Deadly
Combination, 79 FLA. B.J. 79, 79 (2005) ("Family and intimate assaults involving firearms are 12
times more likely to end in fatality than those not associated with firearms.").
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disproportionate amount of public attention and criminal justice
resources."30
Judges may assume that the danger is over if the parties have
separated, but domestic violence survivors face the greatest risk of
acute violence and lethality during the actual separation from an
abusive partner and the ensuing years.31 Rather than ensuring safety,
leaving or attempting to leave often escalates and intensifies the
violence. Martha Mahoney coined the phrase "separation assault" to
describe the increase in the batterer's quest for control when the
survivor seeks to leave the relationship and the subsequent "attack on
the woman's body and volition in which her partner seeks to prevent
her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force her to return."32
Mahoney explains,
Men who kill their wives describe their feeling of loss of control over the woman as a
primary factor; most frequently, the man expresses the fear that the woman was about
to abandon him . . . The fact that marital separation increases the instigation to violence
shows that these attacks are aimed at preventing or punishing the woman's autonomy.
They are major-often deadly-power moves.
33
Further quantitative and qualitative research confirms that
high-level violence is often the result of the abuse survivor's departure
from the relationship, not the survivor's failure to leave. Studies have
shown that an abuse survivor's risk increases by seventy-five percent
upon leaving and that this level of danger continues for two years.34
Approximately two-thirds of all women who separate from their
abusive partners are revictimized by them.35 In one study, researchers
30. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U.
L. REV. 343, 348 (2007) (identifying the ongoing need to change the public's perception of non-
stranger violence as less serious'than stranger violence).
31. Barbara Hart, Beyond the 'Duty to Warn'" A Therapist's 'Duty to Protect" Battered
Women and Children, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 234, 240 (Kersti Yll &
Michele Bograd eds., 1988) ("The decision by a battered woman to leave is often met with
escalated violence by the batterer."); Klein & Orloff, supra note 28, at 815--16 ("Violence is often
triggered by the anger aroused by threatened loss and excessive feelings of dependency-making
the period during and after separation an extremely dangerous time.").
32. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-6, 65 (1991) (exploring abusers' attacks and violent and
coercive acts when a woman decides to separate or begins to prepare to separate from her
batterer).
33. Id. at 65.
34. SIN BY SILENCE (Quiet Little Place Productions 2008).
35. Koziol-McLain et al., supra note 12, at 97-99 (finding that two-thirds of separated
abused women were revictimized during the four-month period of the study, and concluding that
"even though abused women separate from their partners, they do not automatically become
safe"); see also ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 110 (1987) ("Some estimates
suggest that at least 50 percent of women who leave their abusers are followed and harassed or
further attacked by them.").
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found that seventy-five percent of reported domestic violence incidents
involved women who were already separated from their batterers.36 In
a qualitative study on attempted homicides by intimate partners, the
femicide attempts typically occurred as the abused women were
attempting to leave their relationships.37 Consistent with Mahoney's
theory, women described a sequence of arguments about the abusive
partner's behavior, the survivor's decision to leave the relationship,
the abuser's pleas to get her back, and his attempt to kill her when he
realized she intended to leave.38 Another study revealed that the
proximity of an abusive partner to the victim is a key factor in post-
separation assaults.39
In addition to the immediate threat of separation assault,
continued abuse can happen over lengthy periods of time with
prolonged gaps between incidents.40 While at least one-third of
abusers reabuse in a short timeframe, more do so when examining
longer periods of time, with longitudinal studies showing gaps of
several years between abusive incidents for some abusers.41
B. Courthouse Dangers
The short-term nature of most states' protection orders fails to
account for the risk the courthouse itself poses to victims and the
danger of repeatedly engaging the abusive partner in litigation about
the violence. Abuse survivors go to court seeking protection, but
returning to court every year to seek extensions of the court's
protection is a physically and psychologically dangerous prospect.42
Regarding the psychological risk, one scholar notes, "If one set out by
36. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON
CRIME AND JUSTICE 3 (2d ed. 1988).
37. Christina Nicolaidis et al., Could We Have Known? A Qualitative Analysis of Data from
Women Who Survived an Attempted Homicide by an Intimate Partner, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
788, 791 (2003).
38. Id. (Consistent with the concept of separation assault, in a small number of cases, the
man initiated the separation and became violent when the woman began a new dating
relationship or refused to return to him.).
39. Ruth E. Fleury et al., When Ending the Relationship Does Not End the Violence:
Women's Experiences of Violence by Former Partners, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1315, 1376
(2000).
40. Andrew R. Klein, Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence Research, Part I:
Law Enforcement, 29-30 (April 2008) (unpublished research report), available at
http://perma.cc/V9J-4EYQ.
4 1. Id.
42. See Kathleen A. McDonald, Battered Wives, Religion, and Law: An Interdisciplinary
Approach, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 251, 260 (1990) (discussing intimidation from both a
survivor's batterer as well as from the court).
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design to devise a system for provoking intrusive post-traumatic
symptoms, one could not do better than a court of law."43 As the order
draws near to expiring, abuse survivors weigh the risks against the
benefits and determine whether to reengage the abusive partner. For
those who desire the court's protection for another year, they brace
themselves as they return to the courthouse, file a motion to extend
the order, arrange for personal service, and anticipate encountering
once again the person who has abused them.44
Domestic violence courts are more dangerous than any other
type of court.45 A court hearing provides an abusive party with a
precise date and time where the abuser will find his or her target of
abuse. Attorneys who specialize in representing abuse survivors are
well aware of the frequency of courthouse assaults and insist that
"[b]attered women not only need good laws, they need safe
courthouses so they will not be killed, abused, or followed home by
their abusers."46 Describing the eruption of violence at the courthouse
in a jurisdiction with yearlong protection orders, one scholar writes,
"On numerous occasions lawyers were forced, by default, to intervene
during verbal and physical attacks by batterers."47
Accounts of domestic violence victims being killed at the
courthouse are sobering reminders of the lethality of domestic
violence. Shirley Lowery had moved to an undisclosed location to
escape her abusive boyfriend, Benjamin Franklin, who had raped her,
43. JUDITH LEWIs HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 72 (1992).
44. Survivors' safety concerns extend beyond the initial civil protection order hearing to
subsequent extension, modification, or contempt proceedings, along with paternity, dissolution,
custody, and child support actions. See Andrew Klein, Dear Readers, NAT'L BULL. ON{ DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PREVENTION, Aug. 1999, at 1:
It's a well-known fact that leaving a violent partner is particularly dangerous
for victims. Flight may replace repeated physical and emotional abuse with
life-threatening attacks, even death. But if the victim is married to her
batterer, she faces another dangerous obstacle: divorce court. Abusive men
often use divorce court to further their campaign of control, abuse, and terror
against their victims. Unwittingly, divorce courts often act as compliant
coconspirators with the batterers.
45. See Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of
Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 308-09 (1995) (reporting on the frequency of physical or
verbal assaults experienced by protection order litigants in Colorado); see also Phil Trexler,
Woman Seeking Protection Order Attacked in Summit County Courtroom, http://perma.cc/8X3W.
E4Z4 (ohio.com, archived Mar. 16, 2014) (noting that there is only one security guard assigned to
that floor of the courthouse).
46. Zorza, supra note 45, at 308.
47. Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 33-34 (1999)
(noting that in the District of Columbia, occurrences of hallway assaults declined with increased
security and better lighting).
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threatened her life and the life of her family members, and stalked
her.48 She filed for a protection order in Milwaukee, and her daughter
drove her to court on the trial date to seek a two-year order of
protection. Just a few feet outside of the courtroom, Mr. Franklin
stabbed Ms. Lowery nineteen times with a butcher knife, killing her.49
When he was arrested, police found that he also was carrying a loaded
firearm.50 Ms. Lowery's daughter reflected, "My mother had so much
hope in the courthouse. But if you can't go to the courthouse, what
kind of hope do these women have? My mother has none. She's
dead."5 1 Another highly publicized example involved Timothy
Blackwell, who attempted to strangle his wife the day after they
married.52 During divorce proceedings to dissolve their brief and
abusive marriage, Mr. Blackwell fatally shot his wife, her unborn
child, and her two friends inside King County Superior Court in
Seattle, Washington, moments before closing arguments were
scheduled to begin.53
Advocates in many jurisdictions strive to remedy courthouse
security and structural issues that endanger domestic violence
litigants. Common problems include dark, overcrowded, and poorly
monitored hallways; the absence of a safe waiting area for litigants;
unsecured bathrooms; the failure to make daycare available to
litigants; and courthouses that close entirely during lunchtime.54
Electronic security is now common. Security guards, however, may not
be vigilant, and the entryway-screening process causes opposing
parties to wait in lengthy lines, often in close proximity to each
other.55 Security officers who witness abuse, harassment, or other
48. Don Terry, Killing of Woman Waiting for Justice Sounds Alert on Domestic Violence,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1992, at A14, available at http://perma.cclU4HD-RVY6.
49. Id.
50. Id. ('The death of Mrs. Lowery saddened this city because of the viciousness of the
slaying and, even more perhaps, because of where it happened: in the weary heart of the system
she had hoped would help and protect her.").
51. Id.
52. Timothy Egan, Mail-Order Marriage, Immigrant Dreams and Death, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 1996, at A1O (recounting the history of the relationship between Timothy and Susana
Blackwell, including the domestic violence that began the day after they were married, and
reporting that Timothy shot and killed his wife, who was eight months pregnant at the time, and
her two friends in the lobby of the courthouse during divorce proceedings).
53. Mia Consalvo, "3 Shot Dead in Courthouse'" Examining News Coverage of Domestic
Violence and Mail-Order Brides, 21 WOMEN'S STUD. COMM. 188, 188 (1998) (describing how
Timothy Blackwell took a semi-automatic handgun from his briefcase and fatally shot each
woman).
54. Zorza, supra note 45, at 309 (citing JOYCE KLEMPERER, TWICE ABUSED 40, 72 (1993)).
55. Id. (reporting the complaints of New York City's Coalition of Battered Women's
Advocates); see Epstein, supra note 47, at 33-34 (saying that, in the District of Columbia,
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blatant violations of protection orders often respond merely by asking
one party to move away from the other rather than arresting the
respondent or serving as a witness to the protection order violation.5 6
There are also security-related problems due to the scheduling
of protection order cases. The norm across jurisdictions is for litigants
on the protection order docket to be told to arrive to court at the same
time even though the court will not hear the first case for some time.
For example, while courts commonly order litigants to appear at 8:30
a.m., courtroom doors often remain locked until 9:00 a.m., and the
judge may not take the bench until around 9:30 or 10:30 a.m.5 7 This
scheduling practice creates overcrowded hallways and makes it
impossible for parties to comply with stay-away orders.
The child support context provides an example of the
government acknowledging the danger that courthouses and litigation
pose to domestic violence survivors. Welfare regulations originally
mandated that custodial parents cooperate with the establishment of
paternity and collection of child support from the non-custodial
parent, even in the face of domestic violence.58 Recognizing the danger
of the courtroom setting and potential for renewed violence,59
Congress created several avenues to permit state child support
agencies to waive the child support cooperation requirements of
victims of domestic violence, including the "good cause" waiver to the
former Aid to Families with Dependent Children program60 and the
Family Violence Option to the Temporary Assistance to Needy
protection order cases were heard in a single courtroom that was located in a dimly lit basement
that was not monitored by security guards, and noting that occurrences of hallway assaults
declined with increased security and better lighting).
56. See Zorza, supra note 45, at 308-09 (explaining that when batterers or their friends
and family violate a protection order in the courthouse in front of court officers, they typically
respond by attempting to quiet the parties and asking one party to move to a different area).
57. Jane K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to Domestic Violence
in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157, 1196 n.156 (2009) (indicating that the
judge takes the bench around 9:30 a.m., although parties are notified to appear at 8:30 a.m.);
Epstein, supra note 47, at 33 (describing how civil protection order cases were scheduled for 8:30
a.m., but judges did not take the bench until around 10:30 a.m.).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2)-(3) (2012).
59. See Naomi Stern, Battered by the System: How Advocates Against Domestic Violence
Have Improved Victims' Access to Child Support and TANF, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 49
(2003):
Because of a batterer's desire to control his former partner, his contact with her in a
courtroom setting could result in renewed violence against her. Paradoxically,
therefore, many low-income victims of domestic violence who are leaving or who have
already left their abusers often must choose between poverty and increased violence
for themselves and their children at their abusers' hands.
60. 45 C.F.R. § 232.40 (1996); Stern, supra note 59, at 49.
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Families program.61 The adoption of these waivers signals recognition
of the danger that survivors face when they are required to come to
court for an adversarial proceeding and continually reengage with an
abusive partner. In contrast, most protection order statutes require a
victim of violence to return to court and confront his or her abuser
after three, six, or twelve months, which does not protect against
violence in the manner that a long-term or indefinite domestic
violence injunction would.
III. THE WIDESPREAD AVAILABILITY OF PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS
Injunctions are traditionally equitable remedies and are
typically available based on common law equitable principles.62 They
may also be rooted in constitutional sourceS63 or statutory
construction,64 with some statutes conferring on plaintiffs a right to
injunctive relief.65
Regarding injunctions based in equity, case law provides
standards, and the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared a four-prong
test for issuing permanent injunctions. The question of the
appropriate standard for issuing permanent injunctions arose in eBay
61. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(i)-(iii); OFFICE OF FAMiLY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES PROGRAM: EIGHTH REPORT TO
CONGRESS 131-32 (2009), available at http://perma.cc/8FWB-K83K (acf.hhs.gov, archived Mar.
16, 2014) (reporting that thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have
adopted the Family Violence Option); cf. Taryn Lindhorst & Julianna D. Padgett, Disjunctures
for Women and Frontline Workers: Implementation of the Family Violence Option, 79 SOC. SERV.
REV. 405, 407, 409 (2005) (discussing problems with the implementation of the exemption); Katie
Scrivner, Comment, Domestic Violence Victims After Welfare Reform: Looking Beyond the Family
Violence Option, 16 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 241, 249-50 (2001) (explaining that waivers are not
regularly provided).
62. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) (noting that "a federal
court considering whether to award permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing plaintiff applies
the four-factor test historically employed by courts of equity").
63. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 699 (1978) (upholding equitable remedies to
correct prison conditions that violated the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (addressing the remedial
issue of how to correct violations of the guarantee of equal protection, following the initial school
desegregation opinion in 1954).
64. See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012) (permitting courts to enter injunctions
for trademark violations); The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012) (permitting
injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and monetary awards); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2012) (permitting injunctive relief in the form of reasonable
accommodations).
65. See, e.g., Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 34-35,
amended by 50 U.S.C. app. § 925(a) (2012) (conferring a right to injunctive relief); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 321-22 (1944) (addressing the right to injunctive relief conferred by the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); Max 100 L.C. v. Iowa Realty Co., 621 N.W.2d 178, 181
(Iowa 2001) (addressing a right to injunctive relief under Iowa competition law).
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Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., an intellectual property case under the
Patent Act.66 The Court declared that, in equity, permanent
injunctions are issued based on a four-factor test that requires the
plaintiff to show (1) the plaintiff has suffered an "irreparable injury,"
(2) the remedies available at law, such as financial relief, are
inadequate, (3) an equitable remedy is warranted after balancing the
hardships to the parties, and (4) the public interest would not be
disserved by issuing a permanent injunction.67
Although the Supreme Court characterized these four prongs
as "well-established principles of equity"6 8 and recently reaffirmed this
test,6 9 the test has not been without criticism.70 For example, Douglas
Laycock notes, "[W]e may be stuck for the indefinite future with an ill-
conceived four-part test that generates a lot of wasted effort and
confusion as it clumsily reaches the result that would have been
reached without it."71 Nonetheless, post-eBay, courts apply the four-
factor test to injunctions in equity beyond the intellectual property
context,72 with the Second Circuit declaring that "eBay strongly
66. 547 U.S. at 388.
67. Id. at 391 (specifically applying these principles to the Patent Act and noting that the
test likewise applies to injunctions under the Copyright Act).
68. Id.
69. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 157-58 (2010).
70. Scholars and courts have extensively critiqued this test for its deviation from the
traditional rules applied to permanent injunctions. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500
F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 (E.D. Va. 2007) (noting on remand from the Supreme Court that there does
not appear to be a difference between the first and second prongs); Mark P. Gergen et al., The
Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
203, 206 (2012) ("eBay has become a remarkable legal juggernaut. In federal courts throughout
the country, and for violations of almost any kind of statutory, regulatory, or judge-made law, the
four-factor test from eBay has overrun and abrogated prior judicial approaches, all in the name
of restoring traditional equity practice."); Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings,
Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61
EMORY L.J. 779, 792-94 (2012) (identifying the eBay holding as an example of the Court changing
the law without consciously attempting to do so through its restatement of existing law); Doug
Rendleman, The Trial Judge's Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV.
LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007) ("Remedies specialists had never heard of the four-point test.... Mhe
Court appears to vindicate a 'traditional' stand for a final injunction that never existed, except
perhaps for a preliminary injunction.").
71. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 83 (Supp. 2009).
72. See Gergen, supra note 70, at 215 ("[Flederal courts now commonly accept the eBay test
as the test for injunctions in virtually all types of cases, from constitutional challenges under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, to actions under various federal regulatory or antidiscrimination statutes, to
diversity actions centered on state tort, contract, or statutory law."); see, e.g., Monsanto, 130 S.
Ct. at 2747-48 (applying the four-prong eBay test to permanent injunctions sought due to
violations of the National Environmental Policy Act); Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291,
297 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying eBay and upholding a permanent injunction against the
enforcement of an overbroad statute that revoked the liquor licenses of all establishments that
featured adult nudity); Brown v. Colegio de Abogados de P.R., 613 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2010)
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indicates that the traditional principles of equity it employed are the
presumptive standard for injunctions in any context."73 Recent
examples of courts issuing permanent injunctions under eBay abound,
and by May 2010, eBay had been cited over 4,100 times.74 Most states
use considerations that are similar to the second, third, and fourth
factors stated in the eBay decision, but they require plaintiffs to show
that the permanent injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable
injury75 rather than utilizing the new eBay formulation that requires
proof of a past irreparable injury.
In contrast to the historic principles governing injunctive relief,
where a statute expressly authorizes the issuance of an injunction, the
traditional equity grounds need not be proven.76 Instead, satisfying
the statutory conditions is sufficient, even where the statutory
requirements of proof set a lower or different standard.77 In the
domestic violence context, injunctions are a statutory creation due to
the historic reasons detailed in Part IV.78 While domestic violence
protection orders have been treated as a unique and distinct remedy,
they are not conceptually different from other civil injunctions.79
Because the general field of injunctions is equitable and equity reveals
the principles that matter more broadly to injunctive relief analysis,
we can situate the analysis of domestic violence protection orders in
this broader field.
(applying eBay to a request for a permanent injunction against Puerto Rico's integrated bar
association and finding the injunction warranted even where damages may be quantifiable when
harm affects the entire class); C.F. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 647 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1191
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (applying eBay to a student's request to enjoin a teacher from expressing
negative views about religion); McManus v. District of Columbia, 530 F. Supp. 2d 46, 80 (D.D.C.
2007) (applying eBay to an employment law case); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Assoc. v. C.R.
Eng., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 972, 984 (D. Utah 2007) (applying eBay to a case under the Federal
Truth in Leasing Act).
73. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
74. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 427 (4th ed.
2010).
75 See, e.g., Grove Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Rice, 90 So.3d 731, 734 (Ala. Civ. App.
2011); City of Dover v. City of Russellville, 215 S.W.3d 623, 625 (Ark. 2005); Saint John's Church
in Wilderness v. Scott, 194 P.3d 475, 480 (Colo. App. 2008).
76. Henderson v. Burd, 133 F.2d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 1943) ("Where an injunction is
authorized by statute it is enough if the statutory conditions are satisfied."); City of Houston v.
Proler, 373 S.W.3d 748, 764-65 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the requirements for
injunctive relief were defined by a specific statute, thus superseding the equitable requirements
generally applicable to common law injunctive relief).
77. Henderson, 133 F.2d at 517; Proler, 373 S.W.3d at 764-65.
78. Infra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 6 (listing cases in which protection orders have been recognized as
functionally equivalent to injunctions).
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Looking across areas of the law, permanent injunctions are
readily available in a variety of contexts. They are widely
acknowledged as the appropriate remedy in trademark,80 copyright,81
trade secret,82 unfair competition,83 and patent84 cases upon a finding
of infringement, with courts historically noting that plaintiffs were
entitled to this relief.85 Permanent injunctions are commonly issued in
a variety of other areas of the law as well, including tax,86 food
safety,87 torts,88 cybersquatting,89 zoning,90 trespass to land,91 waste,92
80. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)
(characterizing permanent injunctions as the "remedy of choice for trademark and unfair
competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at law for the injury caused by a
defendant's continuing infringement").
81. See Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 968 (8th Cir. 2005)
(stating that permanent injunctions in copyright cases are regularly issued because their denial
would amount to "forced license to use the creative work of another," causing irreparable harm to
"inescapably" flow (citations omitted)); L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distrib., Inc.,
98 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[a]s a general rule, a copyright plaintiff is
entitled to a permanent injunction when liability has been established and there is a threat of
continuing violations" (citation omitted)); Cable/Home Comme'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc.,
902 F.2d 829, 849 (11th Cir. 1990) ("[Ilnjunctive relief is a common judicial response to
infringement of a valid copyright.").
82. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2012) (permitting the Attorney General to obtain injunctive
relief for any violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325C.02 (West
2012) (enjoining actual or threatened misappropriation).
83. Game Power Headquarters, Inc. v. Owens, No. CIV. A. 94-5821, 1995 WL 273663, at *7
(E.D. Pa. May 4, 1995) (noting that injunctive relief is the standard remedy in unfair competition
claims because monetary damage alone can only address past wrongs and continued irreparable
injury could include the loss of trade, goodwill, and control of reputation).
84. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (citing Fox Film Corp.
v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (holding that a patent owner possesses "the right to exclude
others from using his property")); Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429
(1908) ("The right which a patentee receives does not need much further explanation. We have
seen that it has been the judgment of Congress from the beginning that the sciences and the
useful arts could be best advanced by giving an exclusive right to an inventor."); Richardson v.
Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989):
Infringement having been established, it is contrary to the laws of property, of which
the patent law partakes, to deny the patentee's right to exclude others from use of his
property.... It is the general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has
been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it.
85. See, e.g., Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("When a
copyright plaintiff has established a threat of continuing infringement, he is entitled to an
injunction." (emphasis in original)).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Pugh, 717 F. Supp. 2d 271, 300-01 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(permanently enjoining a tax preparer from preparing federal tax returns pursuant to an
Internal Revenue Code provision authorizing the injunction of a preparer who "continually or
repeatedly" engages in conduct subject to penalty).
87. See, e.g., U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA News Release, Federal Government
Gains Permanent Injunction Against Raw Milk Producer (Feb. 22, 2012), available at
http://perma.ccX7Z3-N4EX (prohibiting the distribution of unpasteurized milk across state
lines).
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chattel recovery,93  money judgment enforcement proceedings,94
employment,95 defamation,96 and nuisance cases, especially those
which are of a public character or that affect health and safety.97 As
one example of a permanent injunction issued in a trademark case,
the fast food franchisor McDonald's received a permanent injunction
to prevent a dental office from using the name "McDental."98 The court
issued this permanent order even though there was no proximity
between dental services and fast food and no likelihood that the fast
food franchisor would enter the field of dental service.99 Countless
examples of the widespread issuance of indefinite injunctions could be
offered; as an example from a tort case, which is more akin to domestic
violence cases, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis received a permanent
88. See, e.g., Bayview Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. Forster, No. 09-1574, 2010 WL 1881594, at
*3-4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 12, 2010) (issuing a permanent injunction against a buyer who made
numerous harassing phone calls).
89. See, e.g., Citigroup, Inc. v. Chen Bao Shui, 611 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512-13 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(finding that the willful, deliberate, and bad faith registration and use of disputed citybank.org
Internet domain name violated the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and merited a
permanent injunction against the registrant, as well as the maximum statutory award of
$100,000 and attorneys' fees).
90. See, e.g., County of Kendall v. Rosenwinkel, 818 N.E.2d 425, 435-36 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(finding that facts could have supported a permanent injunction issued for the zoning violation of
building a grain bin too close to a roadway, but remanding for a determination of intentional
violations).
91. Floyd Abrams & Gail Johnston, Prior Restraints, in COMMUNICATIONs LAW IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 2008 169 (2008).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also Preferred Med. Imaging, P.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 816 N.Y.S.2d 700
(Table), 3 (Dist. Ct. 2006) (identifying situations in which a New York district court can grant a
permanent injunction to include "money enforcement proceedings").
95. Nordson Corp. v. Plasschaert, 674 F.2d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming the trial
court's issuance of a covenant not to compete that covered Western Europe, the United States,
and Canada).
96. Am. Univ. of Antigua Coll. of Med. v. Woodward, 837 F. Supp. 2d 686, 701-02 (E.D.
Mich. 2011) (enjoining defendant permanently from making certain defamatory remarks).
97. See, e.g., Parker v. Stark Cnty. Health Dep't, No. 5:12cv2552, 2012 WL 6569285, at *1-
2, *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 17, 2012) (upholding a permanent injunction regarding the maintenance of
property found to be a public health nuisance).
98. McDonald's Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127, 1135, 1139
(N.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[T]he court has found that Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction based
on its federal trademark claims[.]').
99. Id. at 1134-35 ("[This court is disinclined to find that Plaintiff, even if it begins
providing dental floss with its french fries, is likely to 'bridge the gap' in any appreciable manner
in this case.").
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injunction to restrain a photographer from violating the former First
Lady's rights of privacy.100
In addition to permanent injunctions being available to protect
business and property interests, in a number of states, judges may
enter permanent injunctive orders regarding domestic violence as part
of a divorce or final child custody decree.101 The fact that many states
permit permanent protection from violence in these arenas hows that
states are not opposed to making this remedy indefinite, although
they generally fail to do so in domestic violence protection orders.102
The selective use of permanent protection in the divorce context
denies protection to non-married individuals, including individuals in
dating relationships and lesbian and gay survivors of domestic
violence who are not permitted to marry in a majority of states.103
Furthermore, this selective use does not account for the religious,
cultural, financial, and other reasons that an individual may
determine to remain married but may also desire protection from
abuse.
The widespread availability of permanent injunctions in a
variety of contexts prompts the question of why orders against
domestic violence are typically of brief duration.
IV. HISTORY REVEALS THE LAW'S DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Part IV seeks to explain the exceptional treatment of domestic
violence injunctions. Section A explores the historic failure of the state
to sanction or respond to domestic abuse. Section B describes how the
statutory remedy of civil protection orders was a breakthrough that
provided protection-although limited-where none previously
existed.
100. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming the trial court's
finding that the photographer was guilty of harassment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, and commercial exploitation).
101. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/220(b) (West 2012) (permitting permanent
orders in other types of civil proceedings, but not through the Illinois Domestic Violence Act);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.050 (West 2012) (permitting permanent restraining orders to be
entered in divorce decrees).
102. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blessing, 683 N.E.2d 724, 725-26 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997)
(finding the Probate Court's issuance of a permanent protective order to be invalid because it
was not issued concurrent with an active divorce case).
103. At the time of this writing, same-sex marriage is permitted in seventeen states and the
District of Columbia. Defining Marriage: State Defense of Marriage Laws and Same-Sex
Marriage, http://perma.ccl6FZY-APEN (ncsl.org, archived Mar. 16, 2014).
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A. The Right of Chastisement and Family Privacy Theory
The historical context in which domestic violence laws evolved
is important to understanding the current limited duration of civil
protection orders. Laws in the United States were constructed to
exclude marital relations from an otherwise comprehensive scope,
with the family deemed private and exempt from legal scrutiny.104
Because family law pertains to intimate and emotional relationships
and is rooted in "sacred command,"105 law defining and regulating the
family has traditionally been treated as exceptional in comparison to
the market.06
The exceptionalism of family law and the legal rules that apply
to violence in the family is a historically driven phenomenon.07
Historically, the doctrine of family privacy shielded abusive partners
from judicial reach and prevented abuse survivors from receiving
protection.108 At common law, a wife's identity was subsumed in her
husband's,09 which prevented her from bringing suit against him.
Husbands had the right of chastisement over their wives and could
104. See, e.g., State v. Edens, 95 N.C. 693, 695-97 (1886) ("We are not disposed ... to break
in needlessly upon that oneness of husband and wife, which is the fundamental and cherished
maxim of the common law. ... ").
105. Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law:
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. CoMP. L. 753,
754 (2010) (identifying the religious roots of family law).
106. See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498, 1501 (1983) ("[The woman's sphere has been described as 'private'
and contrasted with the 'public sphere of the marketplace and government .... '."); Ann
Shalleck, Introduction Comparative Family Law: What Is the Global Family? Family Law in
Decolonization, Modernization and Globalization, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 449, 454
(2011) ("Mhe family/market dichotomy ... is so present across legal systems.").
107. See generally Janet Halley, What is Family Law? A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1 (2011) ("[This Article tells a story of American family law .... Almost without
exception, throughout this account Domestic Relations/Family Law are what they are by virtue
of their categorical distinction from the law of contract and, more broadly, the law of the
market.").
108. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 263-69 (2d ed.
2003):
There is widespread agreement among feminist scholars that notions of 'privacy' and
'private relationships' have stifled change. Elizabeth Schneider, for example, talks of
the 'violence of privacy' to indicate how the conception of male battering as a private
issue continues to ... lead many to deny the pervasiveness and seriousness of
domestic violence as a political issue.
See also Edens, 95 N.C. at 697 (noting that the law regards marriage as permanent and sacred
and "leaves temporary differences and wrongs which one may do to the other to the corrective
hands of time and reflection").
109. See, e.g., Edens, 95 N.C. at 697 (noting that a woman cannot maintain an action
against her husband due to her legal status upon marriage, and describing the oneness of
husband and wife as the "fundamental and cherished maxim of the common law").
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not be subject to prosecution unless they inflicted permanent
damage."x0 In the 1868 case of State v. Rhodes, the North Carolina
Supreme Court refused to prosecute a husband for repeatedly
whipping his wife, concluding, "We will not inflict upon society the
greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the
lesser evil of trifling violence.""' The Court further explained:
[H]owever great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, and even personal conflicts
inflicting only temporary pain, they are not comparable with the evils which would
result from raising the curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the
nursery and the bed chamber. Every household has and must have, a government of its
own, modeled to suit the temper, disposition and condition of its inmates. Mere
ebullitions of passion, impulsive violence, and temporary pain, affection will soon forget
and forgive .... 112
Even after the husband's right of corporal punishment of his
wife was formally repudiated in the late nineteenth century, husbands
were granted formal and informal immunities from criminal
prosecution in the interest of family harmony and privacy.113 Likewise,
while women obtained the capacity to sue without their husband's
consent and joinder, courts continued to grant husbands immunity
110. Blackstone stated that the husband has the right of "restraining [his wife], by domestic
chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or
children." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444. See also Edens, 95 N.C. at 695-96
(holding that a man could "assault and batter[ ]" his wife if he inflicted no permanent injury
upon her, and also that a husband could "wanton[1y] and malicious[1y] slander" the good name of
his wife with impunity); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 455-56 (1868) (holding that the law
recognizes family government "as complete in itself," and will not "invade the domestic forum, or
go behind the curtain" in the absence of permanent injury); State v. Black, 60 N.C. 262, 267
(1864) (holding that a husband has a responsibility to "make [his wife] behave herself" and to
thrash her, if necessary to that end); State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. 123, 126 (1852) (finding that a wife
is not a competent witness against her husband to prove battery that does not inflict permanent
damage). The Hussey court stated:
We know that a slap on the cheek, let it be as light as it may, indeed any touching of
the person of another in a rude or angry manner-is in law an assault and battery. In
the nature of things it cannot apply to persons in the marriage state, it would break
down the great principle of mutual confidence and dependence; throw open the
bedroom to the gaze of the public; and spread discord and misery, contention and
strife, where peace and concord ought to reign.
Id. at 126.
Siegel, supra note 4, at 2118 ("The Anglo-American common law originally provided
that a husband, as master of his household, could subject his wife to corporal punishment or
'chastisement' so long as he did not inflict permanent injury upon her.").
111. 61 N.C. at 458-59 (observing that prosecution in middle-class households would be
"harassing to them, or injurious to society," and that exposure of the higher class would bring
"disgrace" and "ruin").
112. Id.
113. Siegel, supra note 4, at 2120 (noting that such immunities were granted by economic
status to the benefit of middle- and upper-class men).
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from interspousal tort claims114 to preserve the "tranquility of family
relations"115 and prevent "perpetual domestic discord."16 Multiple
other vestiges of coverture persisted throughout the twentieth
century,117 such as the marital rape exception.s18
While family privacy theory has traditionally condoned family
violence, this theory has also influenced the whole of family law in a
variety of noteworthy ways. During the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, the Supreme Court developed a robust doctrine of family
privacy, setting national norms in many areas affecting families.119
The Court recognized a right to marital privacy,120 upheld the
fundamental right to marry and prohibited states from criminalizing
114. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617-18 (1910) (considering the District
of Columbia's Married Women's Property Act, invoking marital privacy rationale for interspousal
tort immunity, and noting that such suits would "open the doors of the courts to accusations of
all sorts of one spouse against the other, and bring into public notice complaints for assault,
slander and libel"); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 308 (1877) (holding the husband immune from
tort liability for assaulting his wife and stating, "[t]he private matters of the whole period of
married existence might be exposed by suits," which would "add a new method by which estates
could be plundered"); Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863)
(examining a statute that gave women the right to sue in contract or tort, and interpreting it to
bar suits for assault against a spouse, noting that even though the woman's right to sue her
spouse for assault "may perhaps be covered under the literal language," this could not be "the
meaning and intent of the legislature, and ... should not be the construction given to the act").
115. Perkins v. Perkins, 62 Barb. 531, 535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872) (finding that allowing a
cause of action between spouses would "overwhelm" the courts and allow "the parties to a
marriage contract to sue each other for every fireside controversy").
116. Longendyke, 44 Barb. at 369.
117. See Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 190
(2003) (observing that marriage "creates a partial void in civil and criminal law enforcement, a
space for wrongdoers to get away with what the state would elsewhere remedy, punish, and
deter. This detriment can be classified as tertiary because even though law plays a direct role in
these exceptions and immunities, many of them are unwritten or informal, a question of
norms."); see also, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981) (considering the validity
of a Louisiana statute that named the husband the "head and master" of the marital
community); Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222-23 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (holding
constitutional a law requiring a wife to use her husband's surname).
118. Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 682 (1996) ("[A]t least thirteen states
still offer preferential or disparate treatment to perpetrators of spousal sexual assault."); Jaye
Sitton, Old Wine in New Bottles: The "Marital" Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. REV. 261, 277 (1993)
("The marital rape exemption went largely unchallenged from the time of Matthew Hale until
the late 1970s.").
119. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 529
(2008) (noting that the Supreme Court's "constitutionalization" of the doctrine has been "[a] mong
the forces transforming American family law over the last fifty years").
120. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) ("We deal with a right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred.").
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interracial marriage,121 and further protected the marital unit by
upholding the marital presumption regarding paternity,
notwithstanding proof that the husband in the case was not the
biological father.122 The Court recognized relational privacy interests
between unmarried couples, specifically in the context of accessing
contraceptives123 and with respect to an adult's right to conduct
consensual sexual relationships in the privacy of his or her home.124
Parents' interests in the care, custody, and control of their children,
and the need for courts to defer to fit parents' decisionmaking, has
been established through multiple cases as well.125 In sum, much of
recent family law has grown from rights developed under the family
privacy theory, which positively permits pluralism and a diversity of
family forms to flourish.126 An ongoing theme in family law is the
tension between family privacy and the need for the state to intervene
to further the fundamental function of government to protect citizens
121. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) ("[A] statutory scheme adopted by the State of
Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
122. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115, 129-32 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("It is a
question of legislative policy and not constitutional law whether California will allow the
presumed parenthood of a couple desiring to retain a child conceived within and born into their
marriage to be rebutted.").
123. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972):
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be
prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally
impermissible .... If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.
124. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986)):
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.
125. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (plurality opinion) (requiring that courts
give "special weight" to fit parents' preferences regarding nonparent visitation); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 234-36 (1972) (permitting Amish parents to withdraw their children
from school after the eighth grade); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(protecting parents' rights to educate their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400
(1923) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a teacher's liberty to provide foreign
language instruction, and affirming that parents' right to educate their children is a
constitutionally protected liberty).
126. See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 60 (1999) ("[T]he American tradition of respect for individual
freedom in shaping one's own destiny and making important personal choices free of government
intrusion, and of encouraging diversity and pluralism warrants that all family relationships
that, in the totality of circumstances, possess such attributes be accorded equal respect,
recognition, and rights . . . .").
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from harm-for example, in cases of child abuse or intimate partner
violence.127
Regarding the state's response to family violence, in the early
1900s, state legislatures created family and juvenile courts to handle
criminal acts committed against spouses and children outside of the
traditional criminal system.128 Rather than punishing the perpetrator
and criminalizing violence against a family member, family courts
encouraged reconciliation, sought to preserve family unity, and
resulted in keeping family violence private.129 Thus, the legal
treatment of domestic assault only shifted in structure and rationale
from marital prerogative to marital privacy; the discourse of
forgiveness and altruism toward this affective bond continued.130
Prior to the 1970s, the only civil remedy available to domestic
violence survivors was to seek a restraining order in the context of a
divorce.131 At that time, divorce was difficult to obtain without an
attorney and required grounds, fees, and extensive proceedings.132
Divorce also necessarily meant that the parties were in a marital
relationship and the petitioner had decided to dissolve the marriage.
Emergency ex parte orders in the divorce required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the penalty for violating the restraining order
127. Logan & Walker, supra note 8, at 676.
128. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 126 (1987).
129. Id. at 137-38; see Siegel, supra note 4, at 2118 (laying out the history of the treatment
of wife battering in the Anglo-American common law); see also Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia
in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving Forward in Lawyering and Law School Clinics, 21
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 226-27 (2011) (identifying how the roots of family courts prevented
domestic violence from being recognized as a public issue and influenced the legal response to
family violence).
130. Siegel, supra note 4, at 2119, 2166, 2169-70. Professor Seigel describes the superficial
change in the status regime of married women as "preservation through transformation." Id. at
2119. She summarizes:
[I]t was no longer necessary to justify a husband's acts of abuse as the lawful
prerogatives of a master. Rather, the state granted a husband immunity to abuse his
wife in order to foster the altruistic ethos of the private realm. In this way, laws that
protected relations of domination could be justified as promoting relations of love. The
regulation of marital violence was thus translated into the language of companionate
marriage prevailing during the industrial era.
Id. at 2169-70.
131. See Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 157, 161 (2003):
The only civil remedy available to most women before the movement to make Orders
for Protection available was an injunction in one of three varieties: temporary
(emergency), preliminary, or a permanent restraining order. In order to get an
injunction, the woman had to bring a lawsuit, which, in most cases, meant a divorce
proceeding.




was civil contempt, which typically only amounted to a "verbal slap on
the hand."133 This route that demanded divorce was not expeditious or
appealing to many married women, and the relief was insufficient to
actually end violence, especially given the weak enforcement
mechanisms. An alternative legal remedy was needed.
B. The Creation of the Domestic Violence Protection Order
Laws against domestic violence grew out of the work of the
battered women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s.134 During this
period, feminists created the first domestic violence shelters and
organized support groups for abused women based on a feminist-
theory approach centered on contextual responses to individual
women's needs.35 Battered-women's activists and scholars then
undertook the substantial task of revolutionizing domestic violence
laws. They sought to transform domestic violence from a private
matter into a public one by creating legal mechanisms to enhance
women's safety and independence.136
Because of historic failures of police to respond appropriately to
domestic violencel37 and of prosecutors to treat intimate partner
violence as a crime,138 significant energy went into developing
aggressive criminal justice responses to domestic violence, with most
states creating mandatory arrest laws and "no-drop" prosecution
133. Id.
134. Lisa Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Refocusing on Women: A New Direction for Policy
and Research on Intimate Partner Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479, 480 (2005).
135. Id.
136. David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of Protection and Their
Impact on Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1451 (2010).
137. See DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 45, 233 (1995) (discussing minimal attention given to domestic
violence complaints and finding that of every one hundred domestic violence assaults, only
fourteen victims call the police, resulting in only 1.5 arrests and 0.49 convictions); Goodman &
Epstein, supra note 134, at 480 (describing how police officers ignored domestic violence calls,
delayed their response for multiple hours, or mediated incidents); see also, e.g., Fajardo v. County
of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1999) (permitting the relatives of a domestic violence
homicide victim to maintain an equal protection claim against the sheriff and county under
§ 1983 based on allegations that the county had a policy or custom that discriminated against
victims of domestic violence by giving lower priority to 9-1-1 domestic violence calls than to 9-1-1
non-domestic violence calls); Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (finding
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was violated by a police department
that consistently provided less protection to domestic violence victims than to victims of stranger
violence).
138. Goodman & Epstein, supra note 134, at 480 (describing how prosecutors rarely pressed
charges in domestic violence cases).
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policies.139 These mandatory responses have been lauded for fulfilling
the state's "promise of equal protection, bodily integrity, and sex
equality,"140 as well as critiqued as disempoweringl41 and endangering
survivors because they discount the survivor's assessment of how the
criminal intervention will affect his or her safety.142 Alongside the
development of mandatory criminal justice system responses to
domestic violence, reformers developed the civil justice remedy of the
protection order.
While traditional civil injunctions have historical roots that
date back to the Court of Chancery in England,143 the first domestic
violence protection order legislation was passed in 1970,144 when
advocates recognized that injunctive relief could "radically alter the
balance of power between abusers and their victims."145 By 1993, each
139. Id. at 480-81 (explaining that mandatory arrest laws require law enforcement o arrest
a perpetrator of domestic violence when there is probable cause to believe that domestic violence
has occurred). "No-drop" prosecution policies mandate that a criminal case will proceed
regardless of the victim's wishes, assuming there is evidence that demonstrates criminal
conduct. Id.
140. Jennifer C. Nash, From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist Legal
Theory, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 303, 304 (2005) ("Thus, mandatory state intervention
functions as a signal that the private is no longer a site of male control and dominance, or a
space where men can abuse women with immunity . . . ."); see also ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER,
BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 186 (2000) (discussing the arguments of
proponents of "no-drop" policies).
141. Aya Gruber, A "Neo-Feminist" Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law Reform,
15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 583, 583-84, 588 (2012) (arguing that feminist criminal law
reformers ended up adopting the agenda of the criminal justice system, and contending that
prosecutors "systematically ignore women's desires to stay out of court, express disdain for
ambivalent victims, and even infantilize victims to justify mandatory policies while
simultaneously prosecuting the victims in other contexts"); G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided:
Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's
Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 244 (2005) (discussing how proponents of mandatory policies
have conservatized the battered women's movement, dislocated it from its feminist origin, and
contributed to the disempowerment of abused women).
142. See Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to
Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 313-17 (2011) (discussing
"no-drop" policies). Tarr explains that, under "no-drop" policies, prosecutors "force an abused
woman to testify regardless of the likely impact of her testimony. Tarr, supra note 131, at 160.
The prosecutors may or may not get a conviction, but even if they do, the conviction will rarely
result in incarceration. Id. Regardless, by forcing her to testify, the prosecutor has created more
chaos for the woman who has already suffered from her lack of meaningful control over her
abuser's violent behavior. Id.
143. OWEN M. FISS, INJUNCTIONS 74 (1972).
144. Tamara L. Kuennen, "No-Drop" Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of
Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 48
(2007).
145. Jaros, supra note 136, at 1451; see also Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic
Violence: Analysis, Commentary and Recommendations, 43 JUv. & FAM. CT. J. 3, 23 (1992):
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state had enacted a protection order statute.146 This survivor-initiated
remedy was intended to be autonomy enhancing47 while also enabling
survivors to further invoke protections of the criminal justice
system.148 In light of the deeply entrenched laws and practices that
condoned violence and the abject failure of police and prosecutors to
respond to domestic violence,149 statutes providing for yearlong
domestic violence protection orders offered significant remedies that
were heretofore unavailable.
As with most legal issues related to family relationships,
including the issuance of divorce and custody decrees, state law
largely governs protection orders and thus varies by state.150 As states
enacted domestic violence protection order statutes to protect victims
of domestic violence and their children from further harm, each state
determined the types of relationships covered, how to define domestic
violence, the relief available, and the length of the orders. While early
statutes addressed "wife abuse," these statutes are now gender-
neutral and generally cover relationships involving marriage, dating,
relatives, or household members.15 1 Domestic violence is commonly
defined as an actual or threatened criminal offense against an
intimate partner or family member. The District of Columbia requires
proof of an offense under the criminal code,152 and Washington State
similarly defines domestic violence as physical harm, assault, bodily
injury, sexual assault, stalking, or the infliction of fear of imminent
physical injury.153 Even if the court determines that abuse has
A new remedy was needed. One that would enjoin the perpetrator from future abuse.
One that would not displace the abused woman from her home but could compel
relocation of the abuser.... One that would advance the autonomy and independence
of the battered woman from the abuser. Civil protection orders were this new remedy.
146. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 33.
147. Kuennen, supra note 144, at 48.
148. See Tarr, supra note 131, at 159.
149. Supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
150. The U.S. Supreme Court has frequently proclaimed that family law is a matter of state
law. See, e.g., Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) ("Mhe whole subject of domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the state, and not to the
laws of the United States."); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584-85 (1859) (including dicta which
gave birth to the "domestic relations exception" to federal diversity jurisdiction).
151. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (2012) (covering domestic partnerships); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.50.010-.020 (West 2012) (defining "[flamily or household members" and allowing
teenagers to receive orders for protection); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28(3) (West 2012) (requiring
that parties who are not married or who do not have a child in common have lived together).
152. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (defining intimate partner violence as "an act punishable
as a criminal offense").
153. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(7)(b) (permitting
the entry of a protection order upon determining that the petitioner has been abused or has
reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic
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occurred, trial judges have wide discretion in granting domestic
violence protection orders based on their perception of what is
necessary to prevent further violence.154 For example, the Oregon
statute requires the respondent to have abused the petitioner within
the prior 180 days and the court to find that the petitioner is in
"imminent danger" of further abuse and that the respondent presents
a "credible threat" to the physical safety of the petitioner or
petitioner's child.155
States have developed their protection order statutes over the
past few decades to include a wide array of injunctive relief that
extends beyond relief available through criminal restraining orders.
Protection orders may prohibit the respondent from abusing,
threatening, harassing, contacting, or coming near the petitioner;
require the respondent o vacate a shared residence; order him or her
to complete counseling for domestic violence, drug abuse, alcohol
abuse, or parenting skills; and award temporary child custody and
visitation, along with attorney's fees.156 Some jurisdictions permit
monetary awards for child support, maintenance, housing payments,
property destruction, or medical expenses due to violence.'57 Select
states allow courts to order global positioning system tracking of a
respondent using a system that has victim-notification capabilities.58
Statutes typically also contain a provision that allows a judge to enter
additional relief that is tailored to the unique safety needs presented
violence, and identifying factors that suggest imminence, such as past threats, harassment,
stalking, and abuse; threats to kidnap children; abuse of pets; actual or threatened use of
weapons; the respondent's criminal history and history of past protection orders; property
destruction; or the respondent's physical restraint of the petitioner in the home or interference
with calling law enforcement); 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (West 2012) (defining abuse as
causing or attempting to cause bodily harm, placing another in "fear of imminent serious
physical harm," or committing child abuse, stalking, or sexual assault).
154. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1) (West 2012) (permitting entry of a protection
order if abuse has occurred and may reoccur); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.3(A) (West 2012)
(allowing courts to enter protection orders when "necessary to protect" the victim).
155. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.718(1) (West 2012).
156. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (describing the different forms of relief the court can
award).
157. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6341 (2012) (allowing for child support and spousal support); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-3 (West 2012) (allowing for various forms of monetary support and
reimbursement).
158. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9(c)(3)(E) (West 2012) (permitting electronic
monitoring if the respondent violates a protection order); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(j)




in the case.159 These survivor-initiated proceedings carry the weight of
enforcement by the criminal justice system or through a separate
contempt action.160
Domestic violence protection order laws are developing as
legislators, judges, academics, and advocates gain greater
understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence, the needs of
abuse survivors, and the means to prevent further abuse. For
example, statutes have evolved over the past four decades to protect
unmarried women and men in heterosexual or homosexual
relationships,161 and many states have expanded relief to address teen
dating violence and the abuse of pets.162 On a national level, the
Violence Against Women Act requires states to give full faith and
credit to protection orders issued in other states.163 The generally
limited duration of protection orders, however, persists, as detailed in
Part V. Making it possible to permanently enjoin abuse is a needed
part of the evolution of the protection order remedy.
V. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXCEPTIONALISM IN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Injunctive relief operates to prevent future harm or injury,164
and domestic violence protection orders, which derive from the
traditional common law civil injunction,65 are widely understood to be
a type of injunction.66 Injunctions are generally assumed to be of
unlimited, permanent duration unless otherwise specified.67In
contrast to seemingly all other areas of law, however, domestic
violence protection orders are typically of brief duration.
159. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (stating that the protective order can "[d]irect[] the
respondent to perform or refrain from other actions as may be appropriate to the effective
resolution of the matter").
160. See Tarr, supra note 131, at 191 (discussing criminal charges as "[o]ne of the greatest
developments of the Order for Protection statutes").
161. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West 2012) (covering "[fQamily or
household members," not just those who are married).
162. See, e.g., id. §§ 26.50.020, 26.50.060 (covering teenagers and pets).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012).
164. Bear v. Iowa Dist. Court for Tama Cnty., 540 N.W.2d 439, 441 (Iowa 1995); see also
Kocken v. Wis. Council 40, 732 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Wis. 2007) ("Before the circuit court can issue a
permanent injunction, 'a plaintiff must show a sufficient probability that future conduct of the
defendant will violate a right of and injure the plaintiff.' ") (quoting Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v.
Nat'l Farmers Org., 280 N.W.2d 691, 700 (1979)).
165. Kuennen, supra note 144, at 47 (identifying "deep historical roots" of civil protection
orders dating to the English Court of Chancery).
166. See supra note 6.
167. Bear, 540 N.W.2d at 441.
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A. The Limited Duration of Domestic Violence Injunctions
A fifty-state survey of protection order statutes conducted for
this Article reveals that domestic violence protection orders are
effective for only a limited interval in most states.168 Although states
have proclaimed that "[p]reservation of the fundamental human right
to be protected from the devastating impact of family violence"69 is
their public policy, most states offer only short-term domestic violence
protection orders. The statutory time period for protection orders is as
brief as three months in Arkansas and West Virginia,170 or six months
in Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Utah.171
Most commonly, the initial order is effective for up to one year;
twenty-two states take this approach.172 Other states have chosen to
make initial orders available for other limited periods of specified
duration; nine state statutes allow orders to be issued for eighteen
168. While orders beyond an ex parte, temporary order are frequently referred to as
"permanent" protection orders, this term is misleading because they are rarely permanent.
169. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 821 N.E.2d 79, 84 (Mass. 2005) (quoting Champagne v.
Champagne, 708 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Mass. 1999)).
170. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(b) (West 2013) (requiring courts to enter orders for
protection for a fixed period that may range from ninety days to ten years); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 48-27-505 (West 2013) (permitting courts to enter orders for ninety or 180 days, and allowing
for a full year in specified instances, such as when the respondent has made a material violation
of a prior protection order; has been convicted of domestic battery, assault, or a felony against a
household member; or has had two or more protection orders issued against him or her in the
preceding five years).
171. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(13) (West 2013); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.040(1)
(West 2013) (allowing entry of the order for a minimum of 180 days to a maximum of one year);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(C) (West 2013) (limiting protection orders involving child custody or
support to six months); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-70(A) (2013) (allowing judges to enter protection
orders for six to twelve months); UTAH CODE ANN § 78B-7-106 (6) (West 2013) (permitting judges
to enter civil protection orders that include child custody, child support, or other relief beyond
the no-contact and stay-away provisions, for fixed periods not to exceed 150 days as the norm
without greater written justification).
172. Twenty-two states permit only yearlong initial orders. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.100
(West 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(K) (2013) (increasing the duration from six months
to one year in 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(d) (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1045(b) (West 2014); D.C. CODE § 16-1005(d) (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 741.30, 784.046 (West
2013) (orders typically last for one year as a convention, rather than a rule of law); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-13-4(c) (West 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306(5) (West 2013); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.5(2) (West 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(e) (West 2013); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 4-506(j)(1) (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(c) (West 2014); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§455.040(1); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-924(3) (West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.080(3)
(West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(VI) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-3(b) (West
2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.716(6) (West 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-70(A); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-505; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-106(b)
(West 2013).
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months to two years,173 and eight states permit orders for three to five
years.174
Several states take a hybrid approach by assigning different
timeframes to different forms of relief and allowing certain provisions
to last indefinitely. For example, in Alaska, protection orders are only
in effect for a maximum of one year, but the provision that prohibits
the respondent from abusing, stalking, threatening, or harassing the
petitioner is effective indefinitely unless the court orders otherwise.175
Louisiana similarly permits a permanent order prohibiting physical
abuse and harassment but limits all other relief in the protection
order to eighteen months.176
In a handful of states, judges have complete discretion over the
time period of the initial protection order177 and may enter permanent
173. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/220(b), (e) (West 2013) (two years); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-26-5-9(e) (West 2012) (providing a presumptive period of two years, but a judge may shorten
it); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136(F)(1) (2013) (eighteen months); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A,
§ 4007(2) (2013) (two years); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 2013) (setting a standard of
issuing orders for up to two years, but permitting judges to issue longer orders when needed);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 2013) (standard orders are for up to two years, and judges
may issue orders for up to five years if there are aggravating circumstances or if the respondent
violates a valid protection order); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025(A)(1)-(2) (West 2013) (standard
protection orders last two years, but a court may issue a lengthier order if the respondent caused
serious bodily injury to the petitioner or if the respondent has been the subject of two or more
prior protection orders); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-106 (permitting the no-contact and stay-away
relief in a protection order to last for two years, but limiting child custody and support to 150
days); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(B) (West 2013) (permitting initial and subsequent orders to
last up to two years).
174. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a), (c) (West 2013) (stating that the first long-term
protection order is not to be more than five years and that, if the judge fails to state an
expiration date, the order will expire after three years); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(2) (West
2013) (three years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(3)(a) (West 2013) (providing protection
orders for a maximum of five years for adults, or, in cases regarding juvenile respondents, until
the respondent urns age nineteen); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.11(3) (West 2013) (orders last
for a fixed period of five years); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(d)-(e) (West 2014) (three years);
R.I. GEN. LAwS ANN. § 8-8.1-3(i) (West 2013) (three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 25-10-1(3)
(2013) (permitting courts to enter protection orders for five years or less); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.125(3)(c) (West 2012) (four years).
175. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.100; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(b) (permitting
the provisions prohibiting abuse and contact to last two years or longer).
176. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136.
177. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(d)(2) (2013) (stating that final protection orders are permanent
unless otherwise specified and may later be modified by court order); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-14-102 (West 2012) (permitting orders to be permanent or shorter); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-
21-15(2)(b) (West 2013) (regarding duration, stating that final orders are issued for an
"appropriate" time period and noting that orders may be amended at any time); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-15-204 (West 2013) (permitting courts to enter orders for a specific period or
permanently); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2013) (permitting orders to be permanent or
shorter); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-07.1-02(4) (West 2013) (entirely the judge's discretion);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060 (West 2013) (permitting permanent orders for adult
petitioners, but limiting restraints on contact between a respondent and his or her child to one
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or fixed orders of any duration.78 Judges in Hawaii, for example, are
instructed to enter the order for a "fixed reasonable" time period, as
the court deems appropriate.79 Some states provide a presumptive
duration but allow judges to deviate and enter shorter or lengthier
periods of protection. For example, Utah provides a presumptive
maximum period of 150 days unless the court issues the order for a
more extended period.180
The following map shows how the durations of domestic
violence protection orders vary across the country. Interestingly, there
is not a pronounced geographic pattern.
year); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(d) (West 2013) (explaining that judges grant orders
for a "fixed period").
178. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(a)(2)(iii) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-
15(2)(b); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-204 (for a specific period or permanently); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-29(b).
179. HAw. REV. STAT. § 586-5.5(a-b) (West 2013).
180. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-106(6)(a) (West 2013) (the norm is that the order shall not
exceed 150 days, unless the judge makes findings on the record for an extended order).
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Figure 1: Maximum Domestic Violence Protection Order
Durations in the United States
Maximum Duration
Ha bnd
AuFied Period or Pemianent
7
For a descriptin of the length of the initial protection order and
extended orders in each state, see the Append x
The examination of states' statutes reveals that protection
orders are often curtailed when the parties have children in
common.'5 For example, some states lirnit the duration of protection
orders when child custody is ordered. Utah limits provisions regarding
child custody and support to five months18 while New Mexico limits
181. Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Efets of Restraining Orders on Domnestic Violence
Victims, in Do ARRSTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214, 233 (Eve Buzawa & Carl Buzawa
ad:, 1996).




protection orders with custody to six months,183 and North Carolina
limits orders regarding custody to one year.84 Washington similarly
limits restraints on communication or contact with children to one
year.85 These practices should be viewed alongside social science
findings that women with children are more likely to experience
violence following the entry of a restraining order or protection order
than women without children.86 The statutory treatment of abused
parents is thus contrary to the need to protect survivors with children.
B. Restrictions on Extended Orders
Across the United States, domestic violence protection order
statutes typically provide only temporary, short-term relief. Unless a
survivor petitions the court for an extension of his or her protection
order, serves the respondent, and prevails at the hearing, the order
expires and the survivor loses the protections previously provided,
including the temporary grant of child custody and any monetary
relief. A Washington appellate court acknowledged "the relatively
short duration of each protection order (one year)" and how the parties
will likely need to return to court each year.187 Reengaging the
batterer and returning to court carries a host of risks,88 and evidence
of the frequent recurrence of abuse following the expiration of
yearlong orders189 suggests that states should increase the duration of
protection orders.
When a petitioner seeks to extend or renew a protection order,
the petitioner typically carries the burden of proving that extended
court protection is necessary for the petitioner's safety. For example,
in Missouri, the petitioner must prove that expiration of the full order
will place the petitioner in immediate and present danger of abuse.190
183. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(C) (West 2013) (limiting protection orders that award child
custody or support to six months and permitting one six-month extension).
184. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-3(b) (West 2013).
185. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(2) (West 2013); cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-204
(West 2013) (permitting permanent or time-limited orders that restrain a respondent from
having contact with his or her children if the child was abused, witnessed abuse, or was
endangered by the abusive environment).
186. Carolyn N. Ko, Note, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved
Question of "Efficacy," 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 374 (2002).
187. In re Marriage of Fischer, No. 36828-5-II, 2009 WL 2469282, at *5 n.6 (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 13, 2009).
188. See supra Part II (describing the dangers of domestic violence in greater detail).
189. Epstein, supra note 47, at 24 n.118.
190. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.040 (West 2013); Vinson v. Adams, 192 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006); cf. FIA. STAT. ANN. §§ 741.30, 784.046 (West 2013) (requiring proof of continuing fear
1050 [Vol. 67:4:1015
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In the District of Columbia and North Carolina, orders may be
extended for "good cause."191 Minnesota requires petitioners to prove
one of the following for an extension or a subsequent protection order
against the respondent: reasonable fear of physical harm, the violation
of a past or existing protection order, stalking, or imminent release
from incarceration.192 Washington, however, places the burden of proof
on the respondent, who is required to prove that he or she will not
"resume acts of domestic violence" against the petitioner or the
petitioner's children once the order expires.193 Some states request
evidence of a violation of the order before extending it,194 while others
specify that additional acts of abuse need not have occurred during the
pendency of the original order.95
While extension durations vary across the map, they are
typically only available for statutorily limited periods of time, similar
to the initial orders.196 For example, after the initial three-month
order in Idaho, upon motion and hearing, a judge can extend the order
for one year.197 A majority of the states that permit yearlong initial
orders allow for yearlong extensions,198 although Delaware only
of violence by the respondent that is objectively reasonable to extend an existing protection
order).
191. D.C. CODE § 16-1005(d) (2013) (permitting judges to also modify or vacate orders for
good cause); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-3(b) (West 2013).
192. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6a) (West 2013).
193. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(3) (West 2013).
194. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(c) (West 2014) (A six-month extension of the
original yearlong order will only be granted "after the Court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that domestic violence has occurred since the entry of the order, a violation of the order
has occurred, if the respondent consents to the extension of the order or for good cause shown.");
cf. Bree Buchanan & Cindy Dyer, 76th Legislative Session Domestic Violence Law Update, 62
TEX. B.J. 922, 923 (1999) (noting that the state previously required proof of a violation of the
original protection order, but amended the law to permit extensions upon proof that the
petitioner fears imminent bodily harm or sexual assault).
195. MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.040(1); Barber v. Barber, 150 P.3d 124, 126 (Wash. Ct. App.
2007) (noting that new acts of violence are not required for a trial court to renew a protection
order).
196. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §455.040 (following the initial order which lasts from six
months to one year, a judge may reissue the order for another six months to one year).
197. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306(5) (West 2013).
198. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(e)(1) (West 2013) ("Upon motion of the plaintiff,
such period may be extended for one additional year."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.080(3) (West
2013) ("An extended order expires within such time, not to exceed 1 year, as the court fixes.");
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.725(1)(a) (West 2013) (requiring a finding that the petitioner would
reasonably fear abuse by the respondent if the order were not renewed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
3-605(b) (West 2013) (allowing the court to extend an order for a period of not more than one
year under certain circumstances); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-106(b) (West 2013) (the order may
be extended for one year upon a showing of good cause); cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(VI)
(West 2013) (stating that the first extension can only be for one year and that additional
extensions can be granted for up to five years each).
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permits a six-month extension.99 As an example of how Wyoming
anticipates that survivors may need additional years of protection, the
statute states, "The order may be extended repetitively upon a
showing of good cause for additional periods of time not to exceed one
(1) year each."200 Select states provide extension periods lasting
several years.201
Some states base the length of the extension on whether or not
the respondent has violated the initial order.202 While the typical
extension in Tennessee is for only one year, if the respondent has
violated a protection order, an extended order may be granted for five
years for the first violation and ten years for a subsequent violation.203
In West Virginia, judges are allowed to extend the initial ninety-day
order for as long as is necessary to protect the petitioner if there has
been a violation of the initial order.204 In Minnesota, after an initial
two-year order, a fifty-year order prohibiting abuse and contact may
be issued if the respondent has violated the prior order more than two
times or if the petitioner has had two or more orders for protection
against the respondent.205 When the statutory framework focuses on
violations in determining the duration of protection, judges often
refuse to extend or reissue orders in the absence of evidence of a
violation of the order. Illogically, some judges surmise that there is no
longer a need for the order when the respondent has followed the
order, rather than understanding that the fact that the respondent
has not violated the time-limited order might mean that the order
successfully prevented danger during its duration.
199. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(b) (West 2014).
200. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-106(b).
201. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(2) (West 2013) (permitting three-year
protection orders to be extended for additional three-year periods); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-
B:5(VI) (following the issuance of a yearlong protection order, a judge may extend the order for
one additional year, and then for up to five years); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B.3(b) (West 2013)
(following an initial one-year order, a judge may extend the order for up to two years; however,
custody orders may only last one year); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(B) (West 2013) (permitting
initial and subsequent orders to issue for up to two years); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.125(4) (West
2013) (permitting four-year orders and a four-year extension when necessary to protect the
petitioner).
202. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(b) (West 2013) (While initial orders in Maryland
cannot be in effect for longer than one year, Maryland allows for a two-year extension if the
respondent violates an original order that was at least six months long).
203. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(d).
204. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-505(c) (West 2013).
205. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6a)(b) (West 2013).
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Seven states permit petitioners to seek permanent orders after
a statutorily fixed brief initial order.206 In Georgia, for example, after
the initial one-year order, the judge may extend the order for three
years or permanently.207 The possibility of permanent orders after
short orders shows that these states are not opposed to indefinite
orders altogether and that the legislature recognizes the need for
ongoing protection from violence. This statutory scheme, however,
requires petitioners who have already proven domestic abuse to return
to court after brief periods to again make the case for why they need
protection.
C. Family Law Exceptionalism Perpetuates the Differential Treatment
of Domestic Violence
The protection order remedy has evolved in significant ways
during the past four decades to cover a broader range of intimate and
family relationships and provide more comprehensive forms of relief;
however, across states the duration of orders has remained fairly
stagnant despite projections for expansion and calls for reform. In
1993, Catherine Klein and Leslye Orloff published an article that
provided a comprehensive review of protection order statutes.208
Regarding the length of protection orders, they reported that over half
of states issue protection orders for only one year, small numbers issue
them for briefer periods, and a handful offer protection orders for two
or three years or without imposing a limit.2 09 Although these scholars
predicted a statutory trend toward lengthier durations of protection
orders,210 twenty years have passed, and their forecast has not come to
fruition. Additionally, between 1991 and 1994, a Model Code on
Domestic and Family Violence was developed by the National Council
206. The following states with yearlong initial orders permit petitioners to return to court at
the conclusion of the year to seek a permanent order: GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (West 2013);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306 (West 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5 (West 2013); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West 2013).
Select states with varying initial orders also allow for permanent extended orders. See
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345 (West 2013) (permitting judges to renew orders for five years or
permanently); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4007(2) (2013) (following an initial two-year
order, a court can enter an order for "such additional time as it determines necessary to protect
the plaintiff or minor child from abuse"); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 8-8.1-3(i) (West 2013) (after an
initial three-year order, the court may extend the order "for additional time as it deems
necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse").
207. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(c).
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of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.211 Significantly, this model
legislation recommended that civil protection orders should remain in
effect "until further order of the court."212 While scholars hailed the
Model Code as the "most influential model law" regarding intimate
partner violence,213 the recommendation for protection orders to be
issued without an expiration date never took hold.
The historic treatment of domestic violence and the continuing
resistance to legal remedies for family violence help explain why calls
for reform have gone unheeded. The ongoing climate of family law
exceptionalism214 has additionally prevented further reform from
occurring in a way that preserves existing status regimes and gender
hierarchies.215
In comparison with other areas of the law, family law has a
marginalized, inferior status,216 with one scholar referring to
constitutional law as "King" and family law as "Cinderella's
211. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, at introduction (1994), available at
http://perma.ccRZ2A-YYN3. The Council was aided by an advisory committee composed of
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, civil family law attorneys, domestic violence advocates,
medical and health professionals, law enforcement personnel, legislators, and scholars. The
model legislation addressed a range of topics, including criminal remedies, civil protection
orders, legal presumptions regarding child custody, and the overall prevention and treatment of
abuse. See also Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1862-65 (2002) (noting procedural due process
deficiencies in the proposed means for issuing orders).
212. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 306(5).
213. Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have Is a Hammer: Society's Ineffective Response to
Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 944 (2011).
214. Halley & Rittich, supra note 105, at 753 (observing that colonial expansion introduced
the idea of the "family/market, family-law/contract-law distinction," and that developing legal
order followed this distinction, and defining family law exceptionalism as "the myriad ways in
which the family and its law are deemed, either descriptively or normatively, to be special").
215. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 2119 (noting that the legal system plays an important role
in perpetuating status differences between husbands and wives).
216. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 828 n.4 (2004)
(noting the relatively low status of family law in the legal academy and profession, especially
when compared to an extremely high-status field like constitutional law or other fields such as
taxation, commercial law, or antitrust, which have more prestige); Martha Minow, 'Torming
Underneath Everything that Grows'" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819,
819 ("Family law is ... 'underneath' other areas of the law. Its low status within the profession is
well-known."); Emily J. Sack, The Burial of Family Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 459, 459 (2008)
(examining the increasing restriction of women's rights; ways the legal system excludes family
law from consideration, including inter-spousal tort immunity, domestic violence, and the
domestic relations exception; and the isolation of family law in the legal academy, and
recommending that family law refocus on the rights of individuals in families); Shalleck, supra
note 106, at 451 (identifying family law exceptionalism and marginalization, and the project of
recasting family law).
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stepsister."217 Commercial litigation is routinely characterized as
"high-stakes," "complex," and involving powerful financial interests.218
Intellectual property cases are described in a similar vein.219 A
market/family dichotomy has long existed and is reflected through
comparative scholars' separation of the individualist and universal
sphere of the market from the altruistic and traditional family
sphere.220 With family law being a highly gender-segregated subject in
academia, this leads to greater isolation and the continuation of the
marginal treatment of family law by courts and the legal academy.221
The domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction is one
demonstration of the marginalization of family law issues in federal
law and federal jurisdiction.2 22 Scholars have argued that family law
217. Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 175, 177 (2000); see also
Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or
the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799, 833 (1988) (stating that female
professors who write about family and juvenile law are considered to be writing on "soft" areas
which are unworthy of serious consideration); Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to
Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2195 (1993). Professor Resnik recounts the advice that she
received as she became a law professor: "Be careful. Don't teach in any areas associated with
women's issues. Don't teach family law; don't teach sex discrimination. Teach the real stuff, the
hard stuff: contracts, torts, procedure, property," and recalling many other women who shared
that they received similar warnings. Id.
218. Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 78-81, 84-87 (2010) (discussing the risk to corporations as a result of the
government's prosecution of Arthur Andersen LLP); Amy Tindell, Toward a More Reliable Fact-
Finder in Patent Litigation, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 309, 314 (2009) (advocating that
specialized courts handle businesses and corporations competing in "high stakes technology
races"); Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1585 (2010):
For business transactions, including high-stakes securities offerings and mergers and
acquisitions, a corporation will routinely engage a law firm, investment bank, and an
accounting firm-and often several of each-to plan, negotiate, and execute these
transactions. After all, business transactions are complex and raise myriad legal,
financial, accounting, and other hurdles for the corporations that undertake them.
Kara Scannell, Proxy Plan Roils Talks on Finance Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2010, at A2
(discussing the "high-stakes issue" of proxy access, or the right of shareholders to nominate
directors and to have their nominees included in the company's proxy statement).
219. Anthony Ciolli, Lowering the Stakes: Toward a Model of Effective Copyright Dispute
Resolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 999, 1013-14 (2008); David E. Sosnowski, Resolving Patent
Disputes Via Mediation: The Federal Circuit and the IFC Find Success, MD. B.J. March/April
2012 , at 24, 24.
220. Fernanda G. Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law, 58 AM. J. COMP.
L. 777, 777-78 (2010) (arguing that this dichotomy further marginalizes family law). See
generally Olsen, supra note 106, at 1497 (arguing that "transcending the market/family
dichotomy" is a prerequisite to "improving the lives of all individuals").
221. Sack, supra note 216, at 481-82.
222. Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal
Work Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 493, 500 (1996) (discussing that public norms shape violence against battered
immigrant women, and that the "traditional marginalization of family law issues in federal law
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litigation is treated as less worthy or important than other federal
questions and less deserving of court time and resources in local
courts.223
Family law, however, has enormous social and political
impacts,224 and individuals are in court on family law matters more
frequently than in any other area of the law.225 Despite the lower
status of family law in the profession and legal academy, individuals
consistently report that family is the most meaningful aspect of their
lives, significantly more so than work, status, or wealth.226 Personal
safety and safety in one's home are surely to be highly valued as well.
Despite progress in the creation of laws against violence, the
legal system continues to perpetuate status differences by giving
diminished protection to domestic violence survivors, most of whom
are female.227 While an overreliance on gender as the explanation for
domestic violence undermines efforts to address same-sex domestic
violence, most abuse is committed by men against women, with
approximately eighty-five percent of victims being female and ninety
percent of perpetrators being male.228 Despite concentrated efforts to
and federal jurisdiction hampers responses to domestic violence," reflecting a public
determination, "tacit or active, about the relative priority of women's claims").
223. Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
131, 138-39 (2009). Professor Harbach observes that the trend toward a domestic relations
exception to federal question jurisdiction "manifests an attitude that federal family law
questions and litigants are less important or worthy than other federal questions. This
expressive message lowers the status of these issues, reinforcing the inferior status of family law
issues vis-A-vis the federal courts, and assuring the continued marginalization of family law." Id.
at 139.
224. Zvi Triger, Introducing the Political Family: A New Road Map for Critical Family Law,
13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 361, 370 (2012) (noting that family law has been marginalized and
cast to the outer periphery of law, despite its social and political importance).
225. CONFERENCE OF STATE ADM'RS, THE STATE JUSTICE INST. AND THE NAT'L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT, 1996, at 25, 37 (1997)
(reporting that in 1996, family law filings constituted sixty-six percent of the civil court docket,
while tort cases, the second most common filing, made up only seventeen percent of the docket).
226. Law, supra note 217, at 175 (discussing how family is generally more valued by
Americans than wealth, employment, or status); Richard Powers, Identity; American Dreaming,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 7, 2000, at 67 (discussing a random sample of over 1,000 adults who were
asked, "Which do you think shows more of who you really are: your role at work, or your role at
home?" Seventy-five percent of respondents said their role at home, seventeen percent said their
role at work, and eight percent were not employed in paid labor outside of the home).
227. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 2119.
228. Studies by the Department of Justice and the American Medical Association have
shown that eighty percent of abuse is male to female, ten percent is male to male, six percent is
female to female, and four percent is female to male. Anne Ganley, Integrating a Feminist and
Socialist Analysis of Aggression: Creating Multiple Models for Intervention With Men Who Batter,
in TREATING MEN WHO BATTER: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND PROGRAMS (P.L. Caesar and L.K
Hamberger, eds., 1989); see also TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 25, at 5 (indicating that one in
four women will experience intimate partner violence during her lifetime).
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combat domestic abuse, each year approximately 1.3 million women in
the United States are physically assaulted by an intimate partner,229
and women experience over five million physical assaults and rapes by
intimate partners yearly.230 In the United States, women sustain
severe injuries through domestic violence at a rate that is more
frequent than the combined number of automobile accidents,
muggings, and stranger rapes they experience.231 As Joan Zorza notes,
"Being female is her greatest predictor of being abused."232 Women
also experience greater severity of violence than men, including higher
levels of serious physical assault and being choked, drowned, or
threatened with a gun.233 The gendered nature and effects of domestic
violence thus give credence to the feminist construction of domestic
violence as a gender-specific deployment of power and violence. Public
norms and the absence of legal protection shape and perpetuate
private violence, and the minimal length of protection afforded to
domestic violence survivors, in comparison to business and property
interests, adversely affects women.
Remnants of the historic treatment of domestic violence
persist, with current statutes offering only limited relief from family
violence and many judges continuing to be reluctant to intervene in
family matters.234 There are countless examples of judicial resistance
or refusal to enforce domestic violence laws.2 3 5 Even today, judges
229. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2003).
230. Id. at 2 ("[A]n estimated 5.3 million [intimate partner violence] victimizations occur
among U.S. women ages 18 and older each year. This violence results in nearly 2.0 million
injuries, more than 550,000 of which require medical attention.").
231. David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt
Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1158 (1995); see also Orly
Rachmilovitz, Bringing Down the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing Substance Over Form in
Personalized Abuse, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495, 495, 507-09 (2008) (describing
differences between stranger and intimate abuse, and suggesting stronger protection for abuse
victims).
232. Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 383, 386 (1994).
233. See Lois Schwaeber, Recognizing Domestic Violence: How to Know It When You See It
and How to Provide Appropriate Representation, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD
CUSTODY: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND POLICY ISSUES 2-1, 2-12 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry
Goldstein eds., 2010); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1211 (1993).
234. See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2000) (noting that violence against women has historically been
characterized as "belonging to the private sphere, removed from the realm of law and politics").
235. See Epstein, supra note 47, at 42-43 ("Too many judges call [family abuse] cases
'unimportant work' and make it known that they do not want them in their courtrooms."); Lynn
Hecht Schafran, There's No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1063-67 (1995) ('The
reports of state supreme court task forces on gender bias in the courts are replete with reports of
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impose more lenient sentences on defendants convicted of domestic
violence crimes than on defendants who commit crimes against
strangers.236 The recent protracted battle to reauthorize the Violence
Against Women Act, which eventually passed five hundred days after
the bill expired, displays the reality of political opposition to measures
to combat domestic violence.237
VI. APPLYING EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS
TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONTEXT
I need to renew my protection order against [my ex-husband] due to his physical
violence inflicted upon me for years. He was physically abusive with me during our
marriage and has been since our divorce and I desperately fear bodily harm, if not
death, will come to me without this protection order. He has had absolutely no regard of
people being present to witness his violence towards me and [1] believe that would
resume without this order.238
This survivor's plea captures the danger she faces, the fear she
carries, the value she puts on a protection order, and the inadequacy
of the length of her short-term order.
While domestic violence protection orders are traditionally
issued under statutory authority, injunctive relief has its roots in
equity. We can thus look to equitable principles to reveal what
matters when considering injunctive relief across areas of the law,
including in the domestic violence context. Part VI explores how
domestic violence cases generally meet the elements for injunctions
found in state law and pronounced by the U.S. Supreme Court in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., wherein the Court declared that in
equity, permanent injunctions are issued based on a four-factor test
that requires the plaintiff to show:
(1) the plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
judges who trivialize violence against women."); Stoever, supra note 142, at 357-58 (citing
examples of judges' cavalier attitudes toward women subjected to potentially lethal domestic
violence).
236. Epstein, supra note 47, at 43.
237. Josh Israel, The Nine Republican Men Who Won't Consider Any Version of the Violence
Against Women Act, http://perma.cc/AWT9-4JZ3 (thinkprogress.org, archived Mar. 16, 2014);
Ashley Parker, House Renews Violence Against Women Measure, http://perma.cc/v9NN-7N2U
(nytimes.com, archived Mar. 16, 2014) (describing the controversy to reauthorize the Act, and
noting that over 1,300 women's rights and human rights organizations had signed a letter in
support of the reauthorization).
238. Barber v. Barber, 150 P.3d 124, 125 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
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(4) the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.239
Analysis of domestic violence injunctions through the lens of
equitable principles suggests the need for long-term domestic violence
injunctions, which could be achieved by reforming the current
statutory scheme.
A. Irreparable Harm
The first factor of the eBay test for permanent injunctions
requires the petitioner to show that she or he has suffered irreparable
harm. In the trademark context, for example, plaintiffs can raise the
likelihood of confusion between goods or services to satisfy this
factor.240 Courts post-eBay have noted that in copyright litigation,
proof of harm to market share or business reputation from copyright
infringement "should not be difficult to establish"241 because once the
copyright is violated, the harm is done. Other ways to prove
irreparable harm in copyright cases include claiming damage to a
company's brand, goodwill, or competitive position, or the ability to
infringe on copyrights.242 Across subject areas, to meet the burden of
proving irreparable harm, courts have noted that damage that is
difficult to calculate qualifies as irreparable harm,243 an interpretation
which seems to repeat the second prong of the eBay test. In deciding
whether the petitioner has experienced irreparable harm, courts also
consider emotional harms.244
Many state standards for issuing permanent injunctions
maintain the pre-eBay element that requires the plaintiff to show that
it would suffer irreparable injury without a permanent injunction.245
While the eBay test requires proof that the plaintiff has suffered
irreparable injury, case law reveals multiple examples of irreparable
239. 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (specifically applying these principles to the Patent Act
and noting that the test likewise applies to injunctions under the Copyright Act).
240. Gen. Nutrition Inv. Co. v. Gen. Vitamin Ctrs., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 66, 73 (E.D.N.Y.
2011) (finding sufficient brand recognition confusion between General Nutrition Center (GNC)
and General Vitamin Center (GVC) for GNC to receive a permanent injunction preventing GVC
from using its current name).
241. Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2009), affd, 658 F.3d
1150 (9th Cir. 2011).
242. Id.
243. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603
(9th Cir. 1991).
244. Opat v. Ludeking, 666 N.W.2d 597, 604-05 (2003) (finding that substantial emotional
injury would result unless an injunction were issued).
245. Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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harm being established because of potential harm to a business's
financial position or competitive edge and to prevent consumer
confusion. For example, courts have issued permanent injunctions to
ensure that vitamin companies and liquor products appear sufficiently
distinguishable in their respective spheres of competition to eliminate
brand confusion.246 Distinctive branding devices like the use of a red
wax seal by Maker's Mark to cap its whisky bottles are now protected
through permanent injunctions.247 Permanent injunctions are widely
accepted in these commercial contexts; even more compelling
circumstances, though materially different, exist in the domestic
violence context. A domestic abuse survivor seeking a long-term
protection order would generally be able to prove a past irreparable
injury or future threat of harm in satisfaction of this element.
Part II described the escalating nature of domestic abuse, the
danger and lethality of domestic violence, and how an abuser's
recurrent exertion of power and control over the survivor pervades the
survivor's experience.248 When we examine individuals' lived
experiences of domestic violence, various contexts, barriers to escaping
violence, and the multiple oppressions abuse survivors face-such as
racism, poverty, immigration status, and disability-we can recognize
the complexities of family violence. For example, research surrounding
domestic violence and pregnancy illustrates the irreparable harm
experienced by many pregnant abuse survivors. Numerous studies
reveal that violence perpetrated during and after pregnancy has
harmful immediate and long-term maternal, fetal, neonatal, and
infant outcomes.249 Pregnant women experience domestic violence at
246. Gen. Nutrition Inv. Co., 817 F. Supp. at 73-74 (finding that the owner of trademark
"GNC General Nutrition Center" demonstrated irreparable injury, as required for a permanent
injunction to issue against its competitor, prohibiting it from using the "GVC General Vitamin
Center" mark); Tiramisu Int'l LLC v. Clever Imports LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1287-88 (S.D.
Fla. 2010) (issuing a permanent injunction to prevent the importer of "Europa Tiramisu" liquor
from infringing on the mark of 'Tiramisu" liquor after conducting a balancing of hardships and
finding "Tiramisu" liquor would suffer irreparable harm based on potential product confusion).
247. Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 680, 705
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (finding that a lack of adequate remedy at law necessitated issuing a permanent
injunction for distiller in trademark infringement action against competitors who infringed
distiller's registered red wax whisky-bottle-seal mark by producing and distributing a tequila
bottle capped with a similar seal), aff'd, 679 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012).
248. Goodkind et al., supra note 23, at 515 ("Once battering begins, it often escalates in
frequency and severity over time.").
249. Beth A. Bailey & Ruth Ann Daugherty, Intimate Partner Violence During Pregnancy:
Incidence and Associated Health Behaviors in a Rural Population, 11 MATERNAL & CHILD.
HEALTH J. 495, 496 (2007) (reporting that researchers estimate that in the United States, on a
yearly basis, more than 300,000 pregnant women experience domestic violence and that this
figure is likely an underestimate because of pregnant women's reluctance to disclose intimate
partner violence); Daniel C. Berrios & Deborah Grady, Domestic Violence Risk Factors and
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rates that are twice as frequent and severe in injury as the rates for
nonpregnant abuse survivors, and research shows that abuse
escalates as the pregnancy progresses.250 Abuse during pregnancy is
associated with significantly increased risks of low birth weight;251
preterm birth;252 fetal trauma, such as miscarriage and spontaneous
abortion;253 maternal uterine and membrane ruptures;254 and
maternal death and concomitant fetal death.255 Pregnant women
experiencing abuse are also at greater risk of homicide than
nonpregnant abuse victims. 256 Finally, if domestic violence occurs
during pregnancy, there is a strong probability that the abuse will
continue after the pregnancy.257
Outcomes, 155 W.J. MED. 133, 134-35 (1991) (recommending that medical professionals suspect
domestic violence when a pregnant woman has injuries such as bruises or lacerations to the
head, extremities, or torso and finding that thirty percent of pregnant domestic violence victims
seeking emergency room treatment reported that they had been abused during a prior pregnancy
and five percent of the study's participants had miscarried due to abuse); Pajarita Charles &
Krista M. Perreira, Intimate Partner Violence During Pregnancy and 1-Year Post-Partum, 22 J.
FAM. VIOLENCE 609, 609 (2007) (describing physical and psychological effects of experiencing
violence during pregnancy); Sandra L. Martin et al., Changes in Intimate Partner Violence
During Pregnancy, 19 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 201, 202 (2004) (finding that half of the low-income
pregnant women who sought prenatal care from a public clinic reported having experienced
domestic abuse during the pregnancy); see also Julie A. Gazmararian et al., Violence and
Reproductive Health: Current Knowledge and Future Research Directions, 4 MATERNAL AND
CHILD. HEALTH J. 79, 80 (2000) (discussing how domestic violence during pregnancy is more
common than other health conditions that doctors routinely screen for, such as preeclampsia nd
gestational diabetes).
250. Rebecca L. Burch & Gordon G. Gallup Jr., Pregnancy as a Stimulus for Domestic
Violence, 19 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 243, 243, 245 (2004) (also reporting high rates of sexual jealousy);
Sandra Martin et al., Pregnancy-Associated Violent Deaths, 8 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 135,
206 (2007) (reporting that pregnant women experienced increased sexual violence victimization
and psychological aggression); see also Sandra L. Martin et al., Stressful Life Events and Physical
Abuse Among Pregnant Women in North Carolina, 5 MATERNAL & CHILD. HEALTH J. 145, 145
(2001) (finding, in a statewide survey of 2,600 postpartum women in North Carolina, that nine
percent of women reported that they had experienced domestic violence during the pregnancy).
251. Prakesh S. Shah & Jyotsna Shah, Maternal Exposure to Domestic Violence and
Pregnancy and Birth Outcomes: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analyses, 19 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH
2017, 2017 (2010).
252. Id.
253. Jana L. Jasinski, Pregnancy and Domestic Violence: A Review of the Literature, 5
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 47, 56 (2004).
254. Dina El Kady et al., Maternal and Neonatal Outcomes of Assaults During Pregnancy,
105 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 357, 359 (2005).
255. Id.
256. Linda Chambliss, Intimate Partner Violence and Its Implication for Pregnancy, 51
CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 385, 388 (2008) (identifying increased homicide rates
during pregnancy); Martin et al., supra note 250, at 135.
257. Jasinski, supra note 253, at 53 (citing a study which reported that victims of marital
rape continue to experience sexual assault during and after the pregnancy); Rebecca O'Reilly,
Domestic Violence Against Women in Their Childbearing Years: A Review of the Literature, 25
CONTEMP. NURSE: J. FOR AUSTL. NURSING PROF. 13, 13-15 (2007) (finding that women are
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The direct and indirect harms of domestic violence to children
are also now well understood. Research shows that intimate partner
abuse is more frequent when there are children in the home.258
Children of batterers are commonly targets of violence, and studies
show a correlation between the frequency and severity of a batterer's
abuse toward an intimate partner and their children.259
Given the complex, prevalent, and dangerous nature of
domestic violence and the vast health, economic, and social
consequences,26 0 many, if not most, abuse cases would satisfy the
"irreparable harm" prong. The kind of irreparable harm in domestic
violence is different from that in copyright or trademark cases. Such
harm, however, is worthy of recognition under this standard; the
textured nature of the injunction is related to the harm. Injunctions
can thus be used to target a copyright violation, address an
employment relationship, or enjoin domestic violence-in each case
acting to prevent recurring and irreparable harm.
B. The Inadequacy of Legal Remedies
In equity, courts must consider whether there are other
adequate legal remedies before issuing a permanent injunction. The
eBay test is no different and incorporates this need for establishing
that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
especially vulnerable to domestic violence during pregnancy and during post-natal years, and
that intimate partner abuse during pregnancy strongly predicts violence following birth, whether
the violence begins during the pregnancy or predates the pregnancy).
258. Burch & Gallup, supra note 250, at 245.
259. Id.
260. See Berrios & Grady, supra note 249, at 134-35 (finding, in a study of 218 women who
sought emergency room care for domestic violence assaults, that 86 percent had previously been
abused by the same partner, approximately 40 percent had previously received medical care for
the abuse, and 13 percent had been admitted to a hospital for prior abuse); Sisley et al., supra
note 27, at 1105-12 (noting the "enormous impact" of domestic violence on individuals' health
and well-being, the "complexity of the social and legal issues surrounding it," and how it is
"highly prevalent, recurrent, and potentially life-threatening"); see also Lauren Bennett Cattaneo
et al., Intimate Partner Violence Victims' Accuracy in Assessing Their Risk of Re-Abuse, 22 J.
FAM. VIOLENCE 429, 434 (2007) (surveying four hundred women who sought protection orders,
were residents of domestic violence shelters, or were complaining witnesses in domestic violence
prosecutions, and finding that nearly ninety percent had experienced "severe" violence during
the past year, such as being "beat up," assaulted with a knife or gun, or raped; that the women
had experienced similarly high levels of psychological abuse; and that seventy percent met the
criteria for being diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder); Hilary G. Harding & Marie
Helweg-Larsen, Perceived Risk for Future Intimate Partner Violence Among Women in a
Domestic Violence Shelter, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 75, 79 (2009) (In a study of women residing in
four domestic violence shelters in Pennsylvania, approximately half of the residents had been
threatened by their partners with a gun or knife, and nearly twenty percent of the women had
had a bone broken by their partner.).
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inadequate to compensate for the injury. Even if alternative legal
remedies are available, the plaintiff can additionally pursue an
injunction to prevent potential future harm as long as there is a threat
of continuation of the injury.261 Furthermore, if permanent injunctive
relief is the only adequate remedy, its denial may be an abuse of the
trial court's discretion.262
In analyzing this prong in the domestic violence context, this
Section rejects the notion that monetary damages can prevent future
violence. It also examines evidence that protection orders are
currently the most effective remedy for preventing violence and that
the duration of orders is associated with their efficacy. This evidence
discounts the adequacy of other remedies and shows the need for the
availability of indefinite protection orders. Furthermore, this Section
explores the ways in which alternate civil and criminal remedies are
frequently insufficient.
1. The Inadequacy of Monetary Damages
When courts evaluate the second prong and inquire whether
there is an adequate remedy at law, they typically focus on whether
damages are difficult to quantify in monetary terms, as is the case
with damage to a business's reputation, goodwill, or brand.263 If
damages are difficult to quantify, pecuniary damages are considered
inadequate, and a permanent injunction is the appropriate remedy.264
The monetary value of preventing physical harm to a person is more
difficult to quantify than business losses, thus suggesting the
appropriateness of indefinite injunctions against abuse.
Domestic violence is the most common tort committed.2 65
However, accessing tort remedies may be prohibitive due to the
expense of maintaining such an action, the lengthiness of related
proceedings, and the judgment-proof nature of many defendants.
261. Penn Oil Co. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 48 F.2d 1008, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (enjoining
fraudulent substitution in gasoline sales); Opat v. Ludeking, 666 N.W.2d 597, 604-05 (Iowa
2003) (finding that the "mere existence of criminal penalties does not preclude a party from
obtaining injunctive relief," that substantial emotional injury would result unless an injunction
was issued, and that no adequate legal remedy is available, and issuing a permanent injunction
to prevent stalking and harassment).
262. U.S. Jaycees v. Phila. Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing the Philadelphia Jaycees to continue to use the name
"Jaycees," since there was great likelihood of confusion with the United States Jaycees, and that
only a likelihood of confusion was required, rather than actual confusion).
263. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949-50 (N.D. Cal. 2009), affd, 658
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).
264. Id.
265. Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 122 (2001).
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Monetary damages neither prevent future violence nor relieve a
survivor of the fear and emotional terror he or she may experience as
a result of an abuser's behavior.
Injunctions are also considered appropriate where one can
anticipate that the defendant's future misconduct would require
repeated lawsuits.266 Part II described the recurrent and dangerous
nature of domestic violence and presented studies showing that past
abuse is the best predictor of future domestic violence. Petitioning for
a protection order can fuel retaliatory violence,267 and the "separation
assault" danger often continues after legal interventions.268 Studies
have shown that the severity of abuse prior to the issuance of a
protection order frequently correlates with the future abuse that the
respondent perpetrates against the petitioner,269 making safety
planning and extended court protection crucial.
2. The Efficacy of Protection Orders
Beyond consideration of the difficulty of putting a price on past
violence and future safety, evidence of the efficacy of domestic violence
protection orders reveals the unique value of these injunctions.
Multiple studies have shown that protection orders are effective both
at eliminating or substantially decreasing violence270 and at helping
266. Opat, 666 N.W.2d at 604.
267. Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 567
n.178 (2003) (providing examples of a Chicago woman who was fatally shot by her ex-boyfriend
the day before the civil protection order hearing and of a woman whose husband shot her to
death when she obtained a temporary protection order against him).
268. Hart, supra note 145, at 33.
269. Harrell & Smith, supra note 181, at 218, 231 (discussing abuse following the issuance
of a protection order in a 1991 study. While eighty-six percent of abused women reported that the
temporary protection order was "very helpful" or "somewhat helpful," less than half of the women
thought the abusive partner knew he had to obey the order. The study found that the severity of
abuse prior to the issuance of the order is predictive of the severity of abuse that occurs after the
court issues a protection order.).
270. See Matthew Carlson et al., Protective Orders and Domestic Violence: Risk Factors for
Re-Abuse, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 205, 205, 214-15 (1999) (concluding that violence survivors
experience a "significant decline in the probability of abuse" following the entry of a protection
order); Holt et al., supra note 8, at 590-92 (2002) (conducting a population-based study and
reviewing police records to examine the effectiveness of protection orders, and finding that
having a permanent protection order was associated with a significantly decreased risk of new
episodes of violence); Judith McFarlane et al., Protection Orders and Intimate Partner Violence:
An 18-Month Study of 150 Black, Hispanic, and White Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 613, 613-
18 (2004) (finding significant reductions in physical assaults, stalking, threats to do bodily harm,
and worksite harassment among women who sought and qualified for protection orders); Judith
McFarlane et al., Intimate Partner Violence Against Immigrant Women: Measuring the
Effectiveness of Protection Orders, 16 AM. J. FAM. L. 244, 248 (2002) (finding that immigrant
women who sought protection orders experienced a significant decrease in violence and stalking
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survivors feel safer and more empowered.271 Social scientists have
concluded that protection orders "appear to be one of the few widely
available interventions for victims of [intimate partner violence] that
has demonstrated effectiveness."2 72 Furthermore, lengthier orders
have been found to produce greater safety outcomes.273 While
protection orders considerably reduce violence, studies also reveal that
abusive partners frequently violate the orders, which demonstrates
the ongoing danger that survivors face and the need for extended
court protection.
Regarding the efficacy of protection orders, a study of nearly
2,700 women who had reported domestic violence to the police found
that those who obtained civil protection orders experienced an eighty
percent decrease in subsequent police-reported physical violence.274
Overall, these women experienced a significantly decreased likelihood
of physical and non-physical intimate partner violence, including
decreased risk of contact by the abusive partner, weapon threats,
injuries, and abuse-related medical treatment.275 An interview-based
study found a seventy percent decrease in physical abuse among
women who maintained their protection orders.276 Similarly, in
another study, eighty-six percent of the women who received a
protection order stated that the abuse either stopped or was greatly
reduced.277 As one example of the life-changing effect of obtaining a
throughout the duration of the study, comparable to reduced violence experienced by women
born in the United States who receive protection orders, and concluding, "Clearly, contact with
the justice system and application for a protection order is a powerful deterrent to further abuse
and can be deemed highly effective in terms of subsequent intimate partner violence against
immigrant women."); cf. Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on
Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 499, 510-
14 (recognizing that abuse survivors use multiple legal and non-legal strategies to prevent
violence; that obtaining only an emergency temporary protection order achieves some women's
goals; and that significant institutional barriers and the lack of representation make it difficult
for many litigants to complete the protection order process).
271. Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When "Enough is Enough'" Battered Women's Decision
Making Around Court Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 414, 423-25 (1995); see also TK
Logan et al., Factors Associated with Separation and Ongoing Violence Among Women with Civil
Protective Orders, 23 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 377, 382 (2008) (in a study of seven hundred women who
received protection orders, seventy-eight percent reported that they felt safe as a result of the
order and the orders were effective).
272. Victoria Holt et al., Do Protection Orders Affect the Likelihood of Future Partner
Violence and Injury?, 24 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 16, 21 (2003).
273. Id. at 18-19.
274. Holt et al., supra note 8, at 589, 591-92.
275. Id.
276. Holt et al., supra note 272, at 20.
277. PTACEK, supra note 10, at 164; see also Julia Henderson Gist et al., Protection Orders
and Assault Charges: Do Justice Interventions Reduce Violence Against Women, 15 AM J. FAM. L.
59, 60 (2001) (discussing Ptacek's research on the effectiveness of protection orders).
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protection order, one abuse survivor stated, "[My batterer] has left me
alone and I've been safe for the first time in years."278
Of particular importance to the argument in favor of long-term
protection orders, social scientists have found that lengthier orders
produce more substantial safety outcomes.279 Multiple studies have
now found a correlation between the duration of the protection order
and the survivor's safety, which researchers have described as a "dose-
response relationship according to the duration of the [civil protection
order]."280 Maintaining the court's protection over time, therefore, is
key to significantly decreasing future violence and sustaining an end
to all forms of abuse.
In conjunction with their length, additional factors can
contribute to the effectiveness of protection orders. For example,
orders that contain more comprehensive and specified relief are more
likely to provide protection to survivors.281 Research has shown that
survivors who are not awarded relief they have sought are more likely
to be re-abused,282 a conclusion that supports the importance of
listening to a survivor's identification of what will make him or her
safe. Differences in communities' implementation and enforcement of
orders and in the availability of confidential shelters and other safety
resources in a geographic region can also affect the efficacy of
orders.283
Another measure of effectiveness is abuse survivors'
perceptions of the value of orders, and studies show that they perceive
protection orders to be effective and crucial to their safety.284 In a
study of women who had recently obtained temporary protection
orders, ninety-eight percent felt more in control of their lives, ninety-
one percent felt that obtaining the order was a good decision, and
eighty-nine percent felt more in control of their relationship as a
278. Epstein, supra note 9, at 96.
279. Carlson et al., supra note 270, at 214 (showing a sixty-six percent overall decline in
women reporting violence before and after protection orders during a two-year follow-up period,
with a sixty-eight percent decline in those with permanent orders, compared to a fifty-two
percent reduction in violence for those with temporary orders); Holt et al., supra note 272, at 20
(finding significant decreases in risk among women who kept their protection orders in effect
over time).
280. Holt et al., supra note 272, at 21.
281. TK Logan et al., Protective Orders in Rural and Urban Areas, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 876, 906 (2005).
282. Harrell & Smith, supra note 181, at 233, 237-40.
283. Logan et al., supra note 281, at 899.
284. Logan & Walker, supra note 8, at 677-78, 682-83 (reporting on a study of seven
hundred women with protection orders and finding that fifty-one percent believed the orders
were "extremely effective," twenty-seven percent found their orders to be "fairly effective," while
fourteen percent did not find the orders effective and seven percent were unsure).
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result of the court order.285 A majority of women report feeling safer
after obtaining protection orders; in a recent study of seven hundred
women with protection orders, forty-three percent felt "extremely
safe," thirty-four percent felt "fairly safe," while ten percent did not
feel safe, and twelve percent were unsure about how they felt.28 6
Abuse survivors also report that the orders help document that the
abuse occurred and convey to the abusive partner that physical
violence is wrong.287
Although protection order holders generally experience an
overall decrease in violence, multiple studies have still found high
rates of protection order violations by abusive partners.288 A review of
thirty-two studies concluded that approximately forty percent of
protection orders are violated.289 Violations are particularly likely
when the respondent stalks the petitioner prior to or following the
issuance of the protection order, or when the parties remain in a
relationship.290 Other factors that predict especially high rates of
domestic violence recidivism include the abuser's use of a weapon, the
number of criminal charges filed against the perpetrator, the presence
of an arrest record for domestic violence and nondomestic violence
crimes, and the history of protection order violations.291 The overall
285. Fischer & Rose, supra note 271, at 417.
286. Logan & Walker, supra note 8, at 683 (finding that women who experienced very severe
violence or stalking felt less safe than protection order recipients who had not had such
experiences).
287. ADELE HARRELL ET AL., COURT PROCESSING AND THE EFFECTS OF RESTRAINING ORDERS
FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 34 (1993); see also Murphy, supra note 270, at 513 (listing
reasons given by women for dropping requests for permanent orders after obtaining temporary
ex parte orders, such as feeling that the order sent the abuser a "message" and that he knows
that "if he does it again he'll be locked up").
288. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 25, at 52. The National Violence Against Women
survey found 69.7% of those stalked, 67.6% of those sexually assaulted, and 50.6% of those
physically assaulted by a partner reported a violation of the order. Id.; see also Carlson et al.,
supra note 270, at 205 (surveying police reports and finding that twenty-three percent of women
who filed for a protection order reported experiencing physical violence after the court filing);
Logan & Walker, supra note 8, at 682-83 (studying seven hundred women with protection orders
using self-reports of specific violent behaviors, arrest records for protection order violations, and
perceptions of violations, and finding that three-fifths of women experienced a violation of the
order and there was no difference in violation rates between urban and rural jurisdictions).
289. Brian Spitzberg, The Tactical Topography of Stalking Victimization and Management,
3 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 261, 261, 275 (2002) (examining thirty-two existing studies to
estimate an average of violations reported across the studies).
290. Logan & Walker, supra note 8, at 685 (finding that women who were stalked following
the entry of the protection order were four times more likely to be physically abused by the
respondent, 4.8 times more likely to experience severe physical harm, and 9.3 times more likely
to be sexually assaulted, as compared with protection order recipients who were not stalked).
291. Rodney Kingsnorth, Intimate Partner Violence: Predictors of Recidivism in a Sample of
Arrestees, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 917, 930 (2006).
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decrease in violence positively demonstrates the value and potential of
protection orders, while the reabuse rates how the need for continued
court protection through long-term or indefinite orders.
The protection order remedy is the legal remedy that most
abuse survivors choose to utilize, but it is not the right path for every
individual. Formal state intervention, either criminal or civil, can
bring unexpected, complicated consequences.292 In some jurisdictions,
the report of children being abused or witnessing abuse will trigger a
Child Protective Services investigation and prompt a "failure to
protect" case to be filed against the abuse survivor.293 A survivor may
also weigh the potential for facing discrimination in housing;
employment;294 and health, life, and homeowner's insurance295 even
when such discrimination is illegal-along with the loss of welfare
benefitS296  and potential immigration consequences.297  The
psychological impact of the court process is an additional material
factor for many survivors.298 Protection orders are not a panacea for
every abuse survivor, but where a survivor desires long-term court-
ordered protection through a civil protection order, such a remedy
should be available.
292. Tarr, supra note 131, at 158 ("By obtaining an Order of Protection, a woman may be
substituting an intimate batterer with the all-powerful state machine.").
293. See generally Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic
Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 94-95 (2001).
294. Tarr, supra note 131, at 181 (noting that employers' concerns about their liability make
abuse survivors unappealing candidates for employment).
295. See Michelle J. Mandel, Ensuring that Victims of Domestic Abuse Are Not
Discriminated Against in the Insurance Industry, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 677, 678 (1998)
(reporting that insurance companies categorize battered women as a high-risk group and state
that it is unfair to have others pay for the cost of their injuries); Sheri A. Mullikin, A Cost
Analysis Approach to Determining the Reasonableness of Using Domestic Violence as an
Insurance Classification, 25 J. LEGIS. 195, 197-98 (1999) (considering insurance generally);
Michael J. Sudekum, Homeowner's Policies and Missouri Law Make Recovery for the Domestic
Violence Victim/Co-Insured an Olympic Challenge, 69 UMKC L. REV. 363, 363 (2000) (regarding
homeowner's insurance); Ellen J. Morrison, Note, Insurance Discrimination Against Battered
Women: Proposed Legislative Protections, 72 IND. L.J. 259, 260, 272 (1996) (reporting that
insurance companies use court documents as underwriting criteria to deny applications, regard
domestic abuse as a "preexisting condition," and charge battered women higher rates because of
their proclivity toward dangerous behavior). Health care reform should address this problem in
the health care industry.
296. Tarr, supra note 131, at 159-60 (recommending that lawyers and advocates counsel
abuse victims about the potential negative consequences of protection orders).
297. See Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for Battered
Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 205-09 (1999) (discussing unique
issues posed by domestic violence in immigrant communities).
298. See Stoever, supra note 57, at 1189-90 ("With the public nature of domestic violence




3. Criminal Alternatives Prove Insufficient
In general, even if the complainant can maintain an action at
law for monetary damages for a past injury or if there are alternative
criminal penalties, he or she can additionally pursue an injunction to
prevent potential future harm as long as there is a threat of
continuation of the wrong.299
Most acts of domestic violence are criminalized,300 making
companion criminal misdemeanor or felony cases possible based on
the same underlying facts of violence. However, many survivors do not
desire criminal justice involvement for themselves or their partners
for numerous reasons, including the collateral consequences of
criminal convictions, the historically negative impact of the criminal
justice system on communities of color, and the sense that the abuser's
arrest will not improve the survivor's safety.301 Safety concerns
surrounding arrest or prosecution are especially warranted because
criminal remedies, such as jail sentences and probationary periods,
are typically very brief.302 Criminal law, therefore, does not
necessarily create safety, and some of the inadequacies of the criminal
remedy are not in the law itself but in its enforcement.
Criminal restraining orders also fail to encompass the range of
relief available through civil protection orders. In contrast to the civil
protection order process, the complaining witness in the criminal case
is rarely involved in negotiating terms of this order and may not even
be aware of its existence. The criminal restraining order is typically a
boilerplate form imposed when the defendant is arraigned, sentenced,
or released. It may not contain the relief necessary for the survivor
and survivor's children's protection. The order commonly requires the
defendant to stay away from and not contact the complaining witness,
but the criminal order typically does not include victim-specific
provisions such as counseling, property possession, custody, child
support, and specific locations to avoid that are tailored to the victim's
school, work, social, and religious activities and those of the children.
Therefore, the criminal restraining order fails to sufficiently meet the
299. Penn Oil Co. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 48 F.2d 1008, 9 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 137 (D.C. Cir. 1931)
(enjoining the fraudulent substitution in gasoline sales); Opat v. Ludeking, 666 N.W.2d 597,
604-05 (Iowa 2003) (finding that the "mere existence of criminal penalties does not preclude a
party from obtaining injunctive relief," substantial emotional injury would result unless an
injunction was issued, and that no adequate legal remedy is available, and issuing a permanent
injunction to prevent stalking and harassment).
300. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 2013).
301. Stoever, supra note 142, at 316-17.
302. Id. at 316 (discussing the commonality of one- to three-day jail sentences for defendants
convicted of domestic violence assaults).
2014] 1069
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
survivor's individualized safety needs. The criminal order also may
not be for a sufficient duration, and frequently is effective for a shorter
period of time than yearlong civil protection orders.303 In contrast, the
civil protection order is initiated by the petitioner and offers survivor-
centered relief. In addition, some jurisdictions permit the enforcement
of civil protection orders through private civil or criminal contempt
actions as an alternative to relying on the prosecutor's office to bring
criminal charges,304 although the District of Columbia has found
private enforcement mechanisms to be unconstitutional.305
As previously discussed, some states permit permanent
protection orders as part of a divorce or final child custody decree.306
However, while someone who has experienced violence may desire a
protection order, he or she may not wish to file for divorce or custody
for manifold reasons, including religious beliefs; social and familial
pressures; economic barriers; and personal reasons, such as hope for
an end to the violence.307 The abuse survivor may also fear escalated
danger upon seeking this "final" remedy and ultimate dissolution of
the relationship, and will weigh the prospect of further abuse
occurring through litigation.308 If an abusive parent is not currently
present in the child's life, the abuse survivor may desire a
continuation of the status quo rather than initiating a custody case
303. For example, in the District of Columbia, it is common for the criminal order to be in
effect for nine months while the civil protection order is regularly in effect for one year.
304. E.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114 (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31
(West 2013); see also Margaret Martin Berry, Protective Order Enforcement: Another Pirouette, 6
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 339, 351 (1995) (explaining the procedural challenges of private
prosecutions of protection order violations, particularly for unrepresented individuals); Zlotnick,
supra note 231, at 1154 ("[The criminal contempt route empowers the battered woman and
assists her in escaping from a violent relationship.").
305. In re Taylor, 73 A.3d 85, 101 (D.C. 2013) (finding the private prosecution of protection
orders unconstitutional and stating:
A criminal prosecution conducted by a self-interested, pro se individual, rather than
by a prosecutor, is simply a different, lesser proceeding. Such a proceeding not only
fails to comport with due process guarantees owed to a defendant, but also does not
fulfill our societal expectations for the prosecution of crime.
306. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
307. See Heather R. Parker, Access Denied: The Disconnect Between Statutory and Actual
Access to Child Support for Civil Protection Order Petitioners, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 271, 293 n.134
(2007) (discussing reasons that divorce may not be an option for certain survivors of domestic
violence).
308. See generally Elayne E. Greenberg, Beyond the Polemics: Realistic Options to Help
Divorcing Families Manage Domestic Violence, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 603, 604 (2010)
(explaining that divorce provides abundant opportunities for continued abuse); Mary Przekop,
One More Battleground: Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and the Batterers' Relentless Pursuit
of Their Victims Through the Courts, 9 SEArrLE J. SOC. JUST. 1053 (2011) (examining the means
by which batterers continue their abuse through the legal process).
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through which the abusive party could gain further access to the child
and petitioner.
Legislatures creating protection orders envisioned that these
injunctions would coexist with or be chosen instead of criminal
sanctions or other civil options. For example, the legislative history
regarding protection orders in the District of Columbia states that
"criminal sanctions should not be the only avenue for correcting such
abuses, because problems of proof and threats to the long-term
stability of the family or home may arise in the seeking of criminal
sanctions."309 Washington State's Domestic Violence Prevention Act
likewise mandates that orders of protection be available even when
similar relief is available in other courts or has already been entered
in a family law or criminal proceeding.310
In sum, while alternative remedies to civil injunctions for
domestic violence may exist, these companion cases and corresponding
orders may not adequately prevent future harm, are not duplicative,
and can coexist with an indefinite domestic violence protection order.
Additionally, injunctions remain necessary because many abuse
survivors wish to reorder their relationships so that they are safe, but
they do not wish to bring in criminal law to do so.
Separation assault and recurrent violence often takes place
over time as the batterer seeks to regain power over the survivor or
punish the survivor for leaving,311 and our laws should respond to the
reality that domestic violence is dangerous when the survivor is in the
relationship, leaving, or remaining apart. Brief protection orders
lasting only three months to one year often will not provide sufficient
protection from harm. As the law evolves to provide further
protections, attorneys, judges, and advocates must avoid putting
survivors in greater danger. Courts also fail to adequately protect
survivors when they assess the need for continued protection only by
examining whether a protection order violation occurred during the
brief span of the average order.
C. Balancing the Hardships
When considering whether to issue a permanent injunction,
federal and state courts compare the extent to which the petitioner
benefits from the injunction with the burden on the defendant. Courts
309. D.C. COUNCIL, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF MAY 12, 1982 ON THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE DC INTRAFAMILY OFFENSES ACT BILL 4-195 11 (1982).
310. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.025(2) (West 2013).
311. Mahoney, supra note 32, at 64-66.
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are accustomed to balancing rights and burdens, deciding which party
should bear the burden and why, and tailoring the injunctive relief.312
Prior sections of this Article described the dynamics of
domestic violence, including the recurrent and escalating nature of
abuse; the safety benefits petitioners generally receive from protection
orders; and the necessity of petitioners frequently returning to court to
maintain judicial protection due to the protection order's brevity-a
return that poses substantial danger and hardship to violence
survivors. In balancing the benefits of long-term protection orders
against the potential burden on respondents, the following subsections
address potential procedural and substantive due process concerns
respondents may raise and the ability to modify or vacate orders in
light of changed circumstances.
1. Procedural Due Process
Protection order respondents may claim that protection orders
unduly infringe upon their liberty and property interests in violation
of due process, thereby creating significant hardship.313 However,
protection order statutes provide for procedural safeguards that
satisfy the due process clause and the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing
test, which requires consideration of (1) the private interest involved,
(2) the risk that the current procedures will erroneously deprive a
party of that interest, and (3) the governmental interest involved, to
determine what process is due.3 14
Before the government can deprive an individual of liberty or
property interests, due process requires the opportunity to be heard
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."315 Protection
order statutes fulfill the fundamental requirements of due process of
312. For example, in cases regarding protests at medical clinics that perform abortions, the
U.S. Supreme Court has considered the extent to which protesters can be enjoined from
approaching the clinics and the women and doctors entering these facilities, balancing First
Amendment rights with access to medical facilities, doctors, and procedures. Cf. Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (rejecting a "bubble" rule that requires a protester to
remain a defined distance away from a person entering or leaving the facility); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (considering a First Amendment challenge and
upholding an injunction that restricts protesters from coming within thirty-six feet of the health
center).
313. See David H. Taylor et al., Ex Parte Domestic Violence Orders of Protection: How
Easing Access to Judicial Process Has Eased the Possibility for Abuse of the Process, 18 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 83, 93-102 (2008).
314. 424 U.S. 319, 332, 334-35 (1976).
315. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14
(1965) ("Mhe fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not mean
that it can under no circumstances be inhibited.").
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providing notice and a meaningful opportunity for the respondent to
be heard by a neutral decisionmaker.316 To receive a temporary or
long-term protection order, the petitioner must first file an affidavit
sworn under oath detailing the allegations of domestic violence and
threat of future harm.17 As with other areas of the law, a judge may
enter a temporary protection order on an ex parte basis if a petitioner
faces "imminent harm" or an "immediate and present danger of
domestic violence."318 The emergency order is in effect pending a full
hearing, which, depending on the jurisdiction, is scheduled to occur in
five days to three weeks.319 Regarding emergency orders that are
issued ex parte, courts have held that the state has a legitimate and
important interest in immediately and effectively protecting abuse
survivors from additional violence, which outweighs individual liberty
concerns so long as the deprivation is temporary and a hearing is
promptly and properly held.320
Longer-term orders require that the respondent receive notice
of the allegations and requested relief by personal service.321 States
also require the opportunity for an adversarial, evidentiary hearing
that includes the right of confrontation and cross-examination, along
with a judicial finding of abuse before a civil protection order can be
entered against a respondent.322 Additional procedural safeguards
316. State v. Karas, 32 P.3d 1016, 1020-21 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Spence v. Kaminski, 12
P.3d 1030, 1035-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
317. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.009 (West 2012).
318. In general, for an ex parte temporary restraining order to be issued, the petitioner
must show that "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition." FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1); see also, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.30(5) (West 2012) (requiring the court to find an "immediate and present
danger" before awarding an ex parte temporary protection order, and permitting the court to
prohibit the respondent from committing acts of domestic violence, to award the petitioner
temporary use and possession of a shared dwelling, and to issue a temporary parenting plan);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §82.0085(a)(2) (requiring that a petition for a temporary protection order
contain "a description of the threatened harm that reasonably places the applicant in fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault").
319. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1004(b) (2012) (permitting the entry of a fourteen-day
temporary protection order if the petitioner's safety is "immediately endangered" by the
respondent); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 84.001, 84.002 (requiring a hearing within fourteen days
and only permitting ex parte orders to last twenty days).
320. State v. Poole, 745 S.E.2d 26, 34-38 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that an emergency
protective order did not violate defendant's procedural due process rights); Rogers v. State, 183
S.W.3d 853, 867 (Tex. App. 2005) ("The temporary and emergency nature of emergency
protective orders allows them to pass constitutional muster.").
321. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1004 (requiring personal service).
322. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9(c) (West 2012) (permitting an order of protection
lasting up to two years to be entered after the respondent has received notice and an opportunity
for a hearing); Furry v. Rickles, 68 So. 3d 389, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). Furry held that the
trial court violated due process when it issued a domestic violence protection order without
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include the requirements that the order be issued by a judicial officer,
that the respondent have actual notice of the order or be personally
served with it to be bound by the order, and that the respondent have
the right to appeal the decision.323 Furthermore, under the Violence
Against Women Act, due process requirements must be met for a state
to be required to enforce a protection order issued by another state.324
Protection orders are a central legal process through which the
state intervenes to protect individuals from harm.325 Legislative
history reveals that protection order laws have the multiple purposes
of protecting the safety of the petitioner and his or her children, and
carrying out the government's and public's interest in preventing
domestic abuse.326 When legislation that is intended to promote public
health, safety, and welfare bears a reasonable and substantial
relationship to that purpose, "every presumption must be indulged in
favor of constitutionality."327 While justice principles can be applied to
conducting a full evidentiary hearing, and noting that time constraints are not a valid excuse for
failing to conduct a full hearing. Id. The court conducted all questioning of the parties and most
questioning of the other witnesses, denied the litigant's request to present the relevant
noncumulative testimony of a pertinent witness, and did not allow him to object to or cross-
examine the opposing party's expert witness. Id.; see also Raney v. Raney, 86 S.W.3d 484, 486-88
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that where the trial court failed to swear in witnesses; asked all of
the questions; and prohibited the respondent's attorney from calling witnesses, presenting
documents, or cross-examining the petitioner's witnesses, the process did not constitute an
adversarial hearing); Doza v. Kitcher, 987 S.W.2d 826, 826-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
the trial court erred when it entered an extended protection order without holding a hearing, and
permitting the respondent to offer evidence in opposition); Castano v. Ishol 824 N.W.2d 116,
119-20 (S.D. 2012) (holding that the trial court improperly limited the former husband's cross-
examination and failed to make adequate factual findings before issuing a domestic violence
protection order).
323. State v. Karas, 32 P.3d 1016, 1020-21 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); see also MacDonald v.
State, 997 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (finding that, although there were
questions regarding whether personal service was properly achieved, the litigant had actual
notice of the protection order and could therefore be bound by it).
324. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(b)(2) (2012). For full faith and credit to be given to a protection
order, "reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard" must be given to the respondent
"sufficient to protect that person's right to due process." Id. "In the case of ex parte orders, notice
and opportunity to be heard must be provided within the time required by State, tribal, or
territorial law, and in any event within a reasonable time after the order is issued, sufficient to
protect the respondent's due process rights." Id.
325. Logan & Walker, supra note 8, at 676.
326. State v. Dejarlais, 969 P.2d 90, 92 (1998) (en banc):
Domestic violence is a problem of immense proportions affecting individuals as well as
communities. Domestic violence has long been recognized as being at the core of other
major social problems: Child abuse, other crimes of violence against person or
property, juvenile delinquency, and alcohol and drug abuse. Domestic violence costs
millions of dollars each year in the state of Washington for health care, absence from
work, services to children, and more.
(quoting LAWS OF 1992, ch. 111, § 1).
327. State v. Lee, 957 P.2d 741, 752 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
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protect state intrusion into families, they may also be applied to
protect individuals from harm, as is the case with domestic violence
protection orders.328
In general, injunction decrees are to be as clear and precise as
possible to inform the defendant of the acts he or she is restrained
from doing, but "obviously the injunction must be in broad enough
terms to prevent repetition of the evil sought to be stopped."329 When
examining injunctive relief in equity, courts sometimes provide broad
injunctive relief beyond what is strictly necessary in order to ensure
the respondent's compliance so that the plaintiff receives the amount
of injunctive relief to which he or she is entitled.330 The breadth of the
injunctive relief will depend on the nature of the enjoined party's
harmful acts.331 Furthermore, in weighing whether an injunctive order
should be entered, the defendant's "voluntary cessation" of the harm is
not grounds for denying a permanent injunction.332 The mere passage
of time and consistent compliance with an injunction also does not
invalidate a permanent injunction.333
2. Substantive Due Process
The respondent in a protection order action may also raise
substantive due process concerns.334 Potential private interests of the
328. Logan & Walker, supra note 8, at 676.
329. Wesware, Inc. v. State, 488 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (examining the
breadth of injunctive orders and degree of specificity required, and commenting that orders
should provide notice, but "should not be greatly concerned with rights of the defendants that are
asserted largely in the abstract'); see also People ex rel. Hanrahan v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 348
N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (examining a permanent injunction that enjoined a
"massage" parlor from allowing employees to engage in sexual activity with patrons, and
construing the order more broadly to uphold a contempt conviction for activities that occurred
after the establishment was renamed to be a "manicure" parlor).
330. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 533 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The
discretionary power of a district court to formulate an equitable remedy for an adjudicated
violation of law is broad. Where necessary for the elimination of the violation, the decree can
properly fence the defendant in by forbidding conduct not unlawful in itself.").
331. JAMES FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 297-99 (2d ed. 2006) (differentiating
between types of permanent injunctions and describing "prophylactic" injunctions).
332. Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 800-01 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding that the district court improperly denied a permanent injunction in a copyright and
trademark case because the denial was based on the defendant's supposed "voluntary cessation"
of infringement).
333. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 64 F.3d 880, 889 (3d Cir.1995) (unwilling
to hold that mere passage of time and temporary compliance are sufficient to warrant lifting an
injunction, and maintaining the permanent injunction despite the contention that the Council
fully complied with the decrees for the last six years and is suffering vexatious harassment and
undue hardship due to the continuing existence of the decrees).
334. Taylor, supra note 313, at 93.
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respondent include freedom of movement, the interest in one's
children, property rights that may be violated through the exclusion
from a dwelling, and other property interests.335 The state, however,
generally has sufficient interests to intervene in these areas, as
described herein.
In some permanent injunction cases, courts find that the
defendant simply does not have a legitimate interest in the behavior
or does not suffer a legitimate hardship.336 This would naturally be the
case when restraining someone from committing inherently unlawful
acts of assaults, threats, stalking, or harassment. Furthermore,
someone who engages in deliberate misconduct is "barred from raising
disproportionality as a reason for refusing equitable relief."337
Regarding liberty interests, protection orders may restrict a
respondent from coming within a certain number of feet of the
petitioner or from going to certain locations, such as the petitioner's
home or workplace. Courts have consistently held that restrictions on
such movement are permissible and do not violate due process when
someone has been deemed to present a danger to others.338 Regarding
injunctive relief, courts are permitted to issue broad injunctions to
make violation more difficult. For example, if a respondent has a
history of abusing and stalking someone, the respondent could be
banned from living within a certain distance of the petitioner to
decrease the risk of future contact.339 Such restrictions are only
335. Id. at 84.
336. See, e.g., Mary Kay Inc. v. Ayres, 827 F.Supp.2d 584, 595-97 (D.S.C. 2011) (imposing a
permanent injunction against the cosmetic company's former independent beauty consultant,
prohibiting the former consultant from continuing to advertise or sell the company's products,
and finding that her activities adversely impacted the company's interests in providing
customers with high quality products and that the public's interest in protecting intellectual
property rights was greater than permitting the former consultant to infringe on the trademark);
Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("Since Psystar does not
(and cannot) claim any legitimate hardships as a result of being enjoined from committing
unlawful activities, and Apple would suffer irreparable and immeasurable harms if an injunction
were not issued, this factor weighs strongly in favor of Apple's motion."), aff'd in relevant part by
658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).
337. FISCHER, supra note 331, at 302 (providing the example of a defendant intentionally
encroaching on another's land and noting that not all harms are amenable to cost-benefit
balancing).
338. See Coyle v. Compton, 940 P.2d 404, 414 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997) ("[Flreedom of
movement may be restricted under the State's police power unless such restrictions
unreasonably infringe upon that freedom.").
339. See FISCHER, supra note 331, at 297-98 ("A proven infringer may be required to keep a
greater distance away from the plaintiffs protected activity than would a non-infringer because
the proven infringer's past actions have demonstrated a weakness to temptation."); see, e.g.,
Zappaunbulso v. Zappaunbulso, 842 A.2d 300, 301 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (affirming the
trial court's entry of a protection order that required the respondent o move out of a house he
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imposed following a judicial finding that the respondent engaged in
acts of domestic violence and presents a danger to the petitioner.
While these types of liberty-restricting injunctions are serious, so are
the underlying actions that necessitate the injunctions.
Second, the constitutionally protected liberty interest in the
parent-child relationship is not without limits: the state can intervene
to protect children's safety and welfare.340 In protection order cases,
after the court makes a finding of domestic violence, the court can
award custody and visitation based on the best interests of the child
and statutory factors.341 All states at least require the court to
consider evidence of domestic violence when determining child
custody, and many states have a rebuttable presumption against the
abusive parent receiving custody.342 The court may find that the
respondent poses such a high level of danger to necessitate supervised
visitation or to prohibit contact with the children.343 If the court
determines that visitation is in the best interest of the child, the court
may enter a visitation plan that permits contact between the
restrained parent and the child but also maximizes safety to the
petitioner by limiting the location and frequency of visits.
Regarding custody determinations in domestic violence
injunctions, respondents could raise concerns that protection order
hearings are commonly expedited hearings that typically do not
provide for extensive discovery, home studies by court evaluators, or
the appointment of guardians ad litem, which are more common in
permanent custody cases. These are strong counterarguments, but on
balance, long-term protection orders satisfy substantive due process
for several reasons. First, a finding of domestic violence must be made
before awarding custody or visitation, as described above, and the
same legal standards for custody apply in protection order and
had recently moved into in his ex-wife's neighborhood based on his history of stalking, harassing,
and threatening his ex-wife).
340. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
341. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6323 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (2013); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/112A-14 (West 2013); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(5) (West 2013).
342. E.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/112A-14; MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(5); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-29(b)(11) (West 2013).
343. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6323; Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 995 (Okla. Civ.
App. 1984) (finding that "interference with [defendant's] visitation rights is significant," but
justifiable given statutory procedural safeguards, where an ex-parte civil protection order
forbidding a domestic violence defendant from communicating with his ex-wife resulted in denial
of his right to visit his children).
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permanent custody cases.344 Although protection order cases are heard
on an accelerated schedule due to the underlying allegations of
violence, either party in a protection order case may depose the other
party and witnesses, issue interrogatories and requests for document
production, seek the appointment of a guardian ad litem or custody
evaluator, or call expert witnesses.345 Finally, a permanent custody
order supersedes the civil protection order, so the respondent can
concurrently or consecutively pursue a permanent domestic relations
case.
Respondents may additionally raise concerns about the validity
of a long-term order to vacate a shared residence. An order to vacate
regards possession of property and does not affect title,346 but a
permanent order for the respondent o vacate a residence in which the
petitioner lacks a property interest would likely amount to an
unconstitutional taking without just compensation.34 7 While a
temporary order to vacate a shared residence is necessary for
immediate safety and is constitutional, some state statutory
provisions regarding vacate orders may need to be amended to satisfy
substantive due process concerns. A long-term or indefinite order
should require, as many states already do, that the petitioner have a
property interest in the dwelling through ownership or lease.348 There
344. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.
345. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(5)-(6) (permitting the court to appoint a guardian
ad litem or court-appointed special advocate to represent the minor child); CAL. R. CT. 5.215
(providing the domestic violence protocol for Family Court Services evaluations); D.C. SUP. CT.
DOM. VIOLENCE R. 8 (providing procedures for discovery in civil protection order cases).
346. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(5) (West 2013); Peters-Riemers v. Riemers,
624 N.W.2d 83, 90 (N.D. 2001) (finding that because title was not affected by the order to vacate
the home that was titled only in the respondent's name, the respondent's due process rights were
not violated).
347. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of . .. property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.");
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (applying the Fifth Amendment to states); see State v. Mueller, 702
N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the district court exceeded its authority when
it ordered the defendant to sign a quitclaim deed turning over to the domestic violence victim his
interest in the home they jointly owned, and finding that while the court had the ability to order
him to vacate the residence, forcing him to give up his property interest amounted to a taking
without due process).
348. D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c)(4) (2013); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/112A-14(b)(2) (2013)
(permitting courts to grant exclusive possession of a residence to the petitioner for a residence
that the petitioner has the legal right to occupy, and providing a test for the court to balance the
hardships to the petitioner and respondent regarding a shared home); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.12(4)(a)(3)(am) (West 2013):
If the petitioner and the respondent are not married, the respondent owns the
premises where the petitioner resides and the petitioner has no legal interest in the
premises, in lieu of ordering the respondent to avoid the petitioner's residence under
par. (a) the judge or circuit court commissioner may order the respondent to avoid the
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remains a question of whether an indefinite protection order that
grants exclusive possession of a home to the petitioner could constitute
a taking because it would deny the respondent means to exercise
many of the rights and indicia of property ownership.349 This question
has not been adjudicated, and the vacate provisions of indefinite or
long-term orders may need to be curtailed to account for both parties'
property rights.
Defendants' due process rights are serious judicial concerns
because of the significance of constitutional protections and procedural
justice. Research shows that respondents are more likely to comply
with protection orders issued by a system that provides procedural
justice.350
3. Modifying or Terminating Injunctive Relief
Respondents subject to orders that are no longer necessary are
not without recourse. Permanent injunctions are equitable remedies
subject to judicial modification or termination on a showing of "good
cause" by either the petitioner or respondent.351 As such, domestic
violence protection orders can typically be vacated or modified for good
cause,352 such as a change in circumstances. 3 5 3 This is significant
because judges may be reluctant to enter an indefinite order if they
premises for a reasonable time until the petitioner relocates and shall order the
respondent o avoid the new residence for the duration of the order.
See also State v. Kameenui, 753 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Haw. 1988) ("There is no constitutionally
protected right to remain free in [one's] home after physically harming someone residing there.");
Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767, 773 (1979). Boyle upheld the Pennsylvania civil protection
order statute and found that the act "validly employs the police power of the Commonwealth, in
a reasonable manner, to abate a well recognized and widely spread social problem.... The
restrictions that the act places on the use of property to protect abused spouses . .. are necessary
to dispel the dangers of domestic violence." Id.
349. See generally Margaret E. Johnson, A Home with Dignity: Domestic Violence and
Property Rights, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
350. Epstein, supra note 211, at 1846-47.
351. FISCHER, supra note 331, at 318.
352. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2013).
353. Alkhoury v. Alkhoury, 54 So. 3d 641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (applying general rules
regarding permanent injunctions and finding that they may be modified or dissolved "whenever
changed circumstances make it equitable to do so'). The court also determined:
In the specific context of a domestic violence injunction, we believe the
'changed circumstances' rule can best be carried out by a requirement that a
party, against whom a domestic violence injunction has been entered, must, if
such party seeks to dissolve the injunction, demonstrate that the scenario
underlying the injunction no longer exists so that continuation of the
injunction would serve no valid purpose.
Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-106(11) (West 2013) ("A protective order may be modified without a
showing of substantial and material changes in circumstances.").
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believe that the threat of violence may not last beyond several years or
if they think the parties may resume their relationship. Instead of the
judge predicting future relationship patterns, it is the role of the
petitioner or respondent to return to court to seek modification or
vacatur of an order if circumstances and needs change. For example, if
the parties resume a relationship, the petitioner may want to remove
provisions that prohibit the respondent from contacting or coming
near the petitioner but keep in place a continuing order that prohibits
the respondent from abusing, threatening, or harassing the petitioner
and that requires the respondent o participate in a domestic violence
intervention program, parenting skills class, or substance abuse
treatment. As with permanent injunctions in other areas of the law, if
the terms of the injunction are no longer fair or just, the order may be
vacated or modified.354
In balancing the hardships to the parties in protection order
actions, multiple courts have concluded that protection order statutes
satisfy a respondent's procedural due process rights and provide a
significant benefit to the public and governmental interests of
preventing irreparable injury.355
D. The Public Interest
For the final prong of the eBay test, the petitioner seeking a
permanent injunction must show that the injunction would not
disserve the public interest.35 6 Courts consider public health, safety,
and economic interests to be of paramount consideration.3 5 7 Courts
also value enforcing the law; for example, courts have found a public
benefit in upholding the rights of copyright and patent holders.358
Legislatures have recognized that "domestic violence is a
problem of immense proportions affecting individuals as well as
354. FISCHER, supra note 331, at 318.
355. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 216-17 (6th Cir. 1999); Ohm v. Wright,
963 So. 2d 298, 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Nkurunziza v. Nyamusevya, No. 10AP-134, 2010
WL 4968636 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2010); State v. Karas, 32 P.3d 1016, 1020-21 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001); Spence v. Kaminski, 12 P.3d 1030 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Lee, 917 P.2d 159, 167-
68 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), affd en banc, 957 P.2d 741 (Wash. 1998).
356. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
357. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934)
(denying an injunction based on the public interest because it would have closed the city's
sewage plant, allowing the entire community's raw sewage to run into Lake Michigan, with
obvious substantial detriment to the public health).
358. See Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("[The public
receives a benefit when the legitimate rights of copyright holders are vindicated."), aff'd, 658
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).
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communities" and that this growing crisis is "at the core of other
major social problems."359 From a policy perspective, the justice
system "has a vested interest in eradicating domestic violence, ending
the intergenerational effects of violence against women, and
protecting the welfare of 'future member[s] of our society.' "360
Protection orders were created to increase victim safety and offender
accountability and provide victims with "easy, quick, and effective
access to the court system."36 Statutes and court opinions also state
that protection order statutes are remedial laws that should be
liberally construed to offer safety and protection to victims, their
children, and the public at large.362 While there is widespread
agreement on the general purpose of protection orders, there is an
absence of legislative history to shed light on the limited length of
most orders or the extended periods offered by several states. When
states have amended their statutes to lengthen the permissible
timeframe of protection orders, the simple reason they offer is that
more time results in more protection.363
Costs related to experiencing domestic violence and to ending
violence are substantial. In the United States, the annual cost of
medical care, mental health services, and time away from work due to
intimate partner violence is estimated to be $8.3 billion (in 2003
dollars).364 Every year, survivors of intimate partner violence lose
nearly 8 million days of paid work, which amounts to more than
359. S.B. 6347, Reg. Sess., 52d Leg. (Wash. 1992) (amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.030).
360. Dana Harrington Conner, Abuse and Discretion: Evaluating Judicial Discretion in
Custody Cases Involving Violence Against Women, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 163, 167
(2009).
361. Wash. S.B. 6347 (amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.030).
362. Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C. 1993) ("The Intrafamily Offenses Act is
a remedial statute and as such should be liberally construed for the benefit of the class it is
intended to protect."); Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Iowa 2001) ("[T]he domestic abuse
chapter is meant to be protective rather than punitive in nature and is given a reasonable or
liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Zappaunbulso v. Zappaunbulso, 842 A.2d 300, 306 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) ("Remedies under the [Domestic Violence] Act are liberally construed
for the protection and safety of the victims and the public at large." (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-29(b)).
363. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (West 2010). The committee report regarding revisions
explains, "Victims of domestic violence and abuse will be afforded better protection if the Family
Court is permitted to extend no contact provisions of protection for up to 2 years and even in
some special cases for indefinite periods of time." Id.; cf. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-603, -605
(permitting three-year or five-year renewals of protection order when the respondent violates the
original order, and deeming that "the public welfare requires it").
364. Wendy Max et al., The Economic Toll of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in
the United States, 19 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 259, 268 (2004).
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32,000 full-time jobs.365 They also lose approximately 5.6 million days
of household productivity due to domestic violence,366 and there are
significant costs for services to children exposed to domestic
violence.367 For a survivor seeking to end violence through a civil
protection order, he or she must bear the costs of transportation to
and from court, daycare for children, and time away from work.3 68 For
the court case, there are often costs associated with receiving copies of
9-1-1 recordings, medical records, and police reports, and achieving
personal service of the petition and court documents.369 The petitioner
may be able to seek reimbursement for attorney's fees and court-
related expenses from the respondent, but this depends on the
respondent's financial situation.
Protection orders serve the public interest by producing
widespread economic and safety benefits. According to a recent study
on the costs and benefits of domestic violence protection orders, every
dollar spent on protection order interventions produced $30.75 in
avoided costs to society.370 In Kentucky alone, protection orders were
estimated to save the state $85 million annually because of significant
declines in domestic abuse and the associated expenses.371 Coupled
with the safety benefits of long-term orders that were discussed in
Part VI.B.2, the financial, physical, and psychological benefits of
protection orders are of value to individual survivors and society at
large.
365. NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2003),
available at http://perma.ce/WF6-YGRU.
366. Id.
367. S.B. 6347, Reg. Sess., 52d Leg. (Wash. 1992) (amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.030).
368. Regarding employment protections, some states have recently enacted laws to permit
domestic violence survivors to seek judicial protection through the civil or criminal justice
systems without jeopardizing their employment. These laws typically require employees to be
permitted to attend court without pay, and with the assurance that they will not be fired for
missing work. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.76.040 (West 2013).
369. Logan et al., supra note 281, at 899 (finding that in a Kentucky study, in rural areas,
petitioners were charged for service and there was a ninety-one percent rate of non-service in
rural counties).
370. TK LOGAN ET AL., THE KENTUCKY CIVIL PROTECTIVE ORDER STUDY: A RURAL AND
URBAN MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE STUDY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER VIOLATION CONSEQUENCES,
RESPONSES, AND COSTS 144 (2009), available at http://perma.ccl9AL3-YTE4.




The limited duration set by most domestic violence protection
order statutes differs from the issuance of injunctions in other areas of
law, and this disparate treatment persists without a legitimate basis.
Most domestic violence cases would meet the statutory and equitable
standards for issuing permanent injunctions, and indefinite relief
should be available in protection order statutes across states to
provide meaningful protection against abuse. This Part explains that
complete judicial discretion has resulted in inadequate protection for
abuse survivors, which necessitates a national standard regarding the
duration of orders. Specifically, this Article proposes the statutory
availability of indefinite domestic violence protection orders. There are
multiple potential solutions that flow from the analysis in this Article;
along with the availability of indefinite protection orders, this Article
recommends a statutory minimum presumptive length of two-year
orders based on current social science data.
A. The Problem with Complete Discretion
Judicial discretion allows courts to tailor protection order relief
to an individual survivor's particular context and safety needs, which
is essential to meaningfully ending violence.372 Unfettered discretion,
however, proves problematic in areas where judges have traditionally
been hostile to the remedy and use their discretion to enter less relief
than the facts warrant and statutes allow. In the child support
context, for example, judges previously had complete discretion over
entering support orders, and their only direction was to make awards
"for the needs of the child."373 This resulted in vastly inconsistent,
unpredictable outcomes and relatively low levels of support awards,
which persisted even after statutory factors provided guidance to
courts.374 As a condition of receiving funding, the federal government
eventually required states to adopt presumptive guidelines for child
support awards and to implement enforcement procedures.375
372. See Stoever, supra note 142, at 363-65.
373. See LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES § 1.01, 4 (2d ed. 2013).
374. Id. (citing studies finding that child support awards in one district court ranged from
6% to 41% of the obligor's income); CTR. FOR POL'Y RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THREE MODELS 37-53 (1989) (finding consistently
higher awards across all income levels after guidelines were enacted).
375. See generally Patricia W. Hatamyar, Interstate Establishment, Enforcement, and
Modification of Child Support Orders, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 511 (2000) (arguing that the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders
Act are essentially working as intended and establishing predictable rules for parties involved in
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Similarly, many judges have been resistant to the protection
order remedy since its inception and have failed to comprehend the
serious nature of domestic violence, as detailed in multiple Gender
and Justice Commission Gender Bias Task Force reports and Fatality
Review studies.376 As one scholar has noted, "Unregulated authority is
not only flawed in cases involving violence against women, it is
dangerous."77 Regarding the length of protection orders, judges
frequently fail to issue long-term orders or to extend orders because
the physical violence is not "recent enough," although the past history,
context, and other factors suggest ongoing danger.78
Even when states permit permanent protection orders, judges
often enter orders for limited periods of time. For instance, in the
Washington case Phasavath v. Haggerty, the husband abused his wife
throughout their marriage by raping her, punching her, and throwing
her across the room when she was pregnant, throwing large objects at
her, and denigrating her.379 After the wife separated from her
child support cases); Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law:
The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 210 (1991) (arguing that judges have
unfettered discretion in family law, as compared to other areas of law, and that their exercise of
discretion jeopardizes fundamental rights of parents and children, and recommending fixed rules
in the context of divorce, similar to child support formulas); Jo Michelle Beld & Len Biernat,
Federal Intent for State Child Support Guidelines: Income Shares, Cost Shares, and the Reality of
Shared Parenting, 37 FAM. L.Q. 165, 169 (2003) (arguing that requiring states to establish
guidelines for "appropriate child support awards" does not solve the problem of unfettered
judicial discretion because there is no specific definition of appropriateness).
376. Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State
Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 1, 58 (1996) (surveying multiple states' Gender
Bias Task Force reports and finding that women are often revictimized by their treatment by
judges, who presume the victim deserved or provoked the violence, and finding that many judges
only consider visible injuries, some judges inappropriately impose mediation or issue mutual
orders, and the court system, in general, trivializes domestic violence); Philip Trompeter, Gender
Bias Task Force: Comments on Family Law Issues, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2001)
(reporting that Gender Bias Task Forces found that judges are not generally knowledgeable
about the dynamics of domestic abuse, and judges believe myths which affect their judicial
decision making, including notions that family violence is a private matter, domestic incidents
are momentary losses of temper, and victims can easily leave the relationship); see also Epstein,
supra note 47, at 4 ("A law is only as good as the system that delivers on its promises, and the
failure of the courts and related institutions to keep up with legislative progress has had a
serious detrimental impact on efforts to combat domestic violence.").
377. Conner, supra note 360, at 166.
378. See, e.g., Tosta v. Bullis, 943 A.2d 824, 829 (N.H. 2008) ("We have also required a
plaintiff to show more than a generalized fear for personal safety based upon past physical
violence and more recent non-violent harassment o support a finding that a credible threat to
her safety exists."); Goodness v. Beckham, 198 P.3d 980, 982-84 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (vacating a
permanent protection order despite a history of severe physical violence and death threats,
because seven years had lapsed since the last physical incident and the court determined that
the ex-husband's recent harassing email messages did not threaten imminent violence).
379. Phasavath v. Haggerty, 151 Wash. App. 1029, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
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husband, he persisted in stalking and harassing her.80 Although the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act permitted the judge to make the
order permanent, the judge renewed the yearlong protection order for
only a one-year term.38'
In most states, the statutory time periods are maximums, and
the length is left to judicial discretion.382 The fact that a jurisdiction
permits a judge to enter an order for up to one or two years does not
mean the judge will award the full time period. Even in jurisdictions
that make permanent orders available, some judges only enter orders
for several months and instruct petitioners to return to court for a
lengthier order if the respondent violates the protection order during
that time.38 3 When the parties have a child in common or are married,
some judges routinely issue the protection order for only a few months
and order the petitioner to file a permanent custody or dissolution
case to receive further court protection.384 Protection order petitioners
may not wish to litigate a divorce or permanent custody case for many
reasons, including reasons related to safety, culture, religion,
indecision about the future of the relationship, and uncertainty of the
court outcome.385 The frequency of court hearings in custody and
dissolution cases creates the danger and emotional toll of repeated
interaction with the abusive partner, the need to take time away from
work, additional transportation and daycare arrangements, and the
expense of extended litigation.386
To encourage judges to enter orders with tailored,
comprehensive relief that expands beyond a standardized form and
carries out the legislative purpose of ending violence, judges must be
permitted discretion to issue customized relief. However, in response
to the use of judicial discretion in ways contrary to legislative intent
and in light of abuse survivors' need for long-term protection, for the
reasons explain below, this Article proposes a minimum two-year
duration when longer-term or indefinite orders are not entered.
380. Id.
381. Id. at *5--6.
382. Supra Part V.A.
383. The Author has observed this in multiple jurisdictions.
384. The Author has observed this and has received multiple reports from attorneys across
Washington of this occurrence.
385. See Conner, supra note 360, at 184-88 (discussing risks to petitioners and children in
divorce and permanent custody cases).
386. See, e.g., Peter G. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions in Addressing Domestic Violence
in Child Custody Disputes, 54 JUV. & FAM. CT. 57, 59 (2003) (discussing "psychological and
emotional abuse" by the abusive partner in custody proceedings); Janet R. Johnston, High-
Conflict Divorce, 4 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 165, 168 (1994) (describing the correlation between
domestic violence and ongoing disputes over child custody).
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B. A National Standard for Protection Order Duration
While states primarily regulate the family, the federal
government has considerable authority to intervene and has done so
on multiple occasions to promote particular public policies or "family
values" and establish national norms.387 For example, Congress has
established child support standards and enforcement mechanisms,388
adopted a series of laws to ensure uniform standards for establishing
child custody jurisdiction and enforcing custody decisions,389 created
unpaid family medical leave from employment,390 and required states
to follow guidelines for issuing public benefits.391 Thus, in numerous
areas affecting intimate relationships, Congress has willingly
established uniformity in family laws.
When Congress determines that a national, standardized
approach is desirable, this can be accomplished either through federal
legislation or state adoption of uniform laws.39 2 While domestic abuse
can occur in manifold and complex ways, survivors' need for long-term
protection from violence does not differ geographically. In addition to
the practical value of a uniform approach, scholars have argued that
the assumption that states should be responsible for the development
of family law should be repudiated because this assumption is
"grounded in archaic sexist notions about women and marriage that
perpetuate the devaluation of women, children, and families."393
387. Law, supra note 217, at 184. For example, under the Defense of Marriage Act, Congress
defined marriage for federal purposes as a legal union between a man and a woman and did not
require states to recognize a marriage entered into by a same-sex couple in another state. The
U.S. Supreme Court subsequently struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, but resisted pure
federalism grounds. Defense of Marriage Act §§ 2-3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(2012); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) ("[I]t is unnecessary to decide
whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it
disrupts the federal balance."); see also Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism and Family
Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156, 165 (2013) (noting that the Court "declined to
formally embrace or accept the categorical family status federalism claim").
388. Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012); Family Support Act of 1988, 42
U.S.C. §§ 651-69 (2012).
389. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012); Unif. Child Custody
Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act § 103, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1997); Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9
U.L.A. 1 (1968).
390. Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2012).
391. See generally Law, supra note 215, at 177 (identifying multiple laws that affect
families, including farm subsidies, minimum wage laws, the treatment of military forces, and the
rules defining eligibility for cash assistance, including tax exemptions, Social Security, Medicaid,
Medicare, disability benefits, welfare, and food stamps).
392. Id. at 183 & n.39.
393. Id. at 180; see also Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts,
79 IOWA L. REV. 1073, 1098-1101 (1994).
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Although the family has historically been shielded from judicial reach
and national legislation, correcting the inferior treatment of domestic
violence injunctions requires a cohesive, national response.
C. Indefinite Protection Orders and Presumptive Minimum Lengths
Given the legal system's historic condonation of domestic
abuse, coupled with ongoing evidence of judicial failure to handle
domestic violence matters appropriately, it is insufficient to merely
make indefinite protection orders available. Instead, it is necessary to
mandate a presumptive minimum length for protection orders to serve
as a baseline. The proposed framework of indefinite orders with a
presumptive minimum length allows for flexibility, ensures greater
protection than is currently offered by most states, and eliminates the
complete discretion that judges typically possess, which can result in
extremely brief orders. With judicial training and oversight, this
approach would also remedy the differential treatment of domestic
violence injunctions, as compared with the permanent protection
available for intellectual property and business interests, and would
be a meaningful manifestation of the public policy against domestic
violence.
Making long-term and indefinite orders available serves
multiple goals,394 the most significant being the protection of domestic
violence survivors from further harm. This approach implements
recent social science research showing that lengthier orders produce
greater safety outcomes,395 thereby furthering the legislative purpose
of protection orders.396 Based on recent social science data,397 a
minimum length of at least two years of court protection is necessary
to provide meaningful judicial oversight, threat of criminal penalties,
and distance between parties who have separated to allow the
survivor to extricate herself or himself from the abusive partner's
control, and lengthier orders are often advisable. Longitudinal studies
of domestic violence survivors are rare, and further empirical research
could support lengthier mandatory minimum periods for protection
orders. Many respondents closely monitor a protection order's
394. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES
686-87 (7th ed. 2011) (explaining the general rationale for rebuttable presumptions to be
fourfold: to serve policy interests, to recognize what is most probably true across a wide range of
cases, to place the burden of proof on the party most likely to have access to the information, and
to assist in cases where definitive proof is not available).
395. Supra notes 273, 279-80, and accompanying text.
396. Supra notes 169, 325-26, 359-61, and accompanying text.
397. Supra notes 34, 40-41, 273, 279-80, and accompanying text.
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expiration date and resume contact, harassment, stalking, or violence
immediately upon the order's expiration, assuming they actually
followed the order while it was in effect.398 For many intimate
relationships with domestic violence, long-term or indefinite orders
are warranted for the reasons described herein, and courts should be
amenable to entering such relief.
Rebuttable presumptions are utilized in many areas of civil
and criminal law.399 Significantly, in the marriage dissolution and
child custody context, proof of domestic violence triggers certain
presumptive outcomes. When there is a finding of domestic violence in
child custody decisionmaking, many states have either a rebuttable
presumption either against joint custody or against an abusive parent
receiving custody.400 Some states provide that evidence of certain
forms of domestic violence triggers a rebuttable presumption that any
visitation between the abusive parent and child must be supervised.401
As a final example, in dissolution cases in some states, a domestic
violence conviction prompts a rebuttable presumption that the Family
Court judge should deny or terminate spousal support.402
The proposed approach maintains the current burden of proof
on the petitioner to prove the statutory elements required for the court
to grant a protection order. The current statutory requirements for
granting protection orders provide a sufficiently high bar for awarding
indefinite or long-term protection orders. Survivors choose particular
courses of action based on their assessments of how much danger they
are in,403 and those who experience greater severity of violence engage
398. See Epstein, supra note 47, at 24 (noting that once the protective order expires, the
couple is "back at square one"). The Author has also represented multiple clients who reported
this occurrence.
399. In marital dissolution proceedings, for example, states commonly have a statutory
rebuttable presumption that spouses have contributed equally to the acquisition of marital
assets during marriage, and courts are to consider both the economic and noneconomic
contributions of the parties. See, e.g., Lovell v. Anderson, 533 S.E.2d 64, 65 (Ga. 2000) (regarding
the application of a rebuttable presumption in an estate matter).
400. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-403.03(D) (2012) (creating a rebuttable presumption
that awarding custody to a parent found to have committed an act of domestic violence would be
contrary to the child's best interest); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(b) (West 2012) (applying a
rebuttable presumption against joint custody upon a finding of domestic violence); see also NAT'L
COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION STATES, available
at http://perma.cc/W4CT-5GLN (reporting that as of September 2012, twenty-three states and
the District of Columbia had adopted statutes creating a rebuttable presumption against sole or
joint custody to batterers).
401. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.3 (West 2012).
402. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4325 (West 2012).
403. See Margaret E. Bell et al., Understanding Domestic Violence Victims'Decision-Making
in the Justice System: Predicting Desire for a Criminal Prosecution, 19 FAM. VIOLENCE & SEXUAL
ASSAULT BULL. 6, 6-15 (2003).
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in more help-seeking efforts, including seeking protection orders as
violence escalates and continues over time.404 Multiple studies have
found that women seeking protection orders have typically
experienced a history of severe violence.405 Taking the initiative to
seek a protection order commits a survivor to a course of action and
indicates an "awareness of serious safety concerns."406 Prior physical
abuse is also well established as a primary risk factor for intimate
partner femicide, although previous physical violence is not present in
all femicide cases.407 While additional factors beyond proof of domestic
violence are unnecessary for granting a protection order, courts could
be instructed to accept evidence regarding the history of the
relationship and the respondent's controlling behaviors that are not in
and of themselves illegal, especially because research suggests that
controlling behaviors indicate heightened danger.408
A review of the small number of state statutes that currently
permit permanent domestic violence protection orders reveals a
spectrum of requirements, some of which are problematic. Delaware
permits the entry of a permanent order of protection upon the finding
of "aggravating circumstances," such as the use of a deadly weapon
against the petitioner, prior convictions of crimes committed by the
respondent against the petitioner, or a history of repeated violations of
prior protection orders.409 Delaware's standard is inadvisable because
it permits too much injury before offering action. Montana, in
contrast, instructs courts to consider the history of violence, severity of
the offense at issue, and the evidence presented at the hearing in
considering whether the petitioner needs permanent protection from
harm.410 Montana's process is more desirable than Delaware's, but
404. See A.L. Coker et al., Help-Seeking for Intimate Partner Violence and Forced Sex in
South Carolina, 19 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 316, 319 (2000) ("[Wle found that help-seeking
increases with increasing violence severity.").
405. Logan et al., supra note 281, at 877; see also Lisa Shannon, Intimate Partner Violence,
Relationship Status, and Protective Orders: Does "Living in Sin" Entail a Different Experience?,
22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1114, 1124 (2007) (in a study of over 750 women with protection
orders, the women had experienced high levels of all forms of intimate partner violence).
406. Logan & Walker, supra note 8, at 688.
407. Nicolaidis et al., supra note 37, at 790.
408. See Keith E. Davis et al., Stalking Perpetrators and Psychological Maltreatment of
Partners: Anger-Jealousy, Attachment Insecurity, Need for Control, and Break-Up Context, 15
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 407, 407 (2000) (finding that stalking had a significant correlation with
psychological abuse of the partner); Troy E. McEwan et al., A Study of the Predictors of
Persistence in Stalking Situations, 33 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 149 (2008) (noting that
"[s]talkers engaging in persistent campaigns of harassment have the potential to cause immense
harm to their victims and themselves").
409. 10 DEL. CODE ANN. § 1045(f) (West 2012).
410. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-204(1) (West 2012).
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heightened attention to the most recent event may obscure evidence of
control and past relevant abuse. Washington permits permanent
orders upon a finding that the respondent is likely to resume acts of
domestic violence if the order were to expire.411 The permanent order,
however, is not available for relief that restricts contact between the
respondent and his or her children; this relief may only be in effect for
one year.412 Washington's statutory construction values the parent-
child relationship by building in yearly review, but there are cases in
which the violence is so extreme that lengthier protection is warranted
from the outset. Washington's failure to permit permanent orders
pertaining to relief regarding children forces parents to return to court
on a yearly basis, making the possibility of permanent orders illusory.
Prioritizing certain forms of violence or attempting to use a
danger or risk assessment tool to determine the appropriate level of
court protection is also ill advised.413 In a study of women whose
partners had attempted to kill them, researchers administered
Jacquelyn Campbell's Danger Assessment tool to measure lethality.414
This instrument is thought to be the most accurate available, but the
women's scores varied dramatically, with some women only
identifying one or two factors and others identifying a majority of the
factors indicating lethality risk.415 Most of the male abusive partners
engaged in "stalking, extreme jealousy, social isolation, physical
limitations, or threats of violence" prior to attempting to kill their
female partners.416 These behaviors are correlated with higher
incidences of severe or lethal violence, but they are also behaviors that
are frequently minimized by fact finders and are difficult to uncover in
the current court structure, which focuses on criminal acts.417
While one possible recommendation would be to make all
domestic violence protection orders permanent, there are several
reasons for alternatives to this approach. First, a permanent order
could be contrary to the petitioner's wishes, and the petitioner in a
411. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060 (West 2012).
412. Id.
413. See Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The Impact of
Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDoZO L. REV. 519, 519-20 (2010) (discussing the
limitations of danger-assessment tools).
414. Nicolaidis et al., supra note 37, at 790.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See id. (noting 83% of women experienced such behavior prior to the attempted
femicide); see generally Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies and
Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1107, 1138 (2009) (noting that while
all states offer remedies for severe or lethal violence, far fewer states offer remedies for harms
such as "emotional, psychological, or economic abuse").
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civil action is entitled to request the relief he or she seeks, including
the duration of the order within the statutory structure. A petitioner
can therefore have decisional autonomy in shaping the requested
scope and duration of the order to be responsive to his or her
particular safety needs. Additionally, if judges are only permitted to
enter permanent orders, they may hold petitioners to higher
standards than the law requires or be more inclined to deny orders.
Reform efforts should seek to minimize negative repercussions, such
as the unintended consequence that the protection order remedy may
become unattainable to those needing protection from violence.
Finally, given that there is potential criminal liability for the violation
of certain provisions of the remedial order, there are legitimate
questions about the length of state involvement and the state's role in
ordering relationships that advise against making all protection
orders permanent.418 The civil protection order remedy should be
flexible enough to provide an abuse victim with tailored long-term
protection while also allowing for modification or termination by the
respondent if the order becomes unnecessary.
Reform typically occurs through stages as a movement builds
consensus needed for legislative change.419 Making indefinite
protection orders available in each state would be a meaningful
advancement alone. Some states could even choose to enact a
presumption of permanent protection orders. In such a regime, once
the court finds that the respondent has committed domestic violence
against the petitioner and that a protection order is warranted, there
would be a presumption that an indefinite order be awarded unless
the respondent offers a compelling justification against the entry of a
permanent order. Given the current limited duration of most domestic
violence injunctions, this Article's proposal for the availability of
indefinite orders with a presumptive minimum length of two years
significantly advances the protection order remedy and sufficiently
protects the constitutional rights of respondents.
418. See generally Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 53-66 (2006)
(discussing final protective orders as a form of "de facto divorce" and their implication on a
possible "right to marry").
419. Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A Transformation of Concurrent Ownership
for Modern Relationships, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 439-45 (2001) (describing how women's
property rights developed through stages of reform); Theodore R. Marmor & Mark A. Goldberg,
Reform Redux, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 491, 494 (1995) ("Everything else being equal,
sooner is better than later, but comprehensive reform in stages is better than inadequate reform
all at once."); Ralph Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, Learning to Crawl: The Use of Voluntary
Caps on Damages in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 703 (2005) ("In a
politically charged climate, broad scale, equitable reform is not likely. Instead, we should begin a




The argument for indefinite injunctions in the domestic
violence context gives safety in one's home and person the same
priority as the protection of intellectual property and business
interests. Domestic violence law developed distinctly from other areas
of the law for reasons that are no longer socially tenable, and
harmonizing domestic violence injunctions with the treatment of other
injunctive relief is overdue. For many survivors of intimate partner
abuse, the threat of violence is always present-if not carried out-
and returning to court is a terrifying and dangerous prospect. In a
society and legal system that have historically tolerated and condoned
intimate partner abuse, the nationwide availability of indefinite
domestic violence protection orders and presumption that orders be at
least two years in duration would serve as an expression of the public
policy that domestic violence is intolerable. And, perhaps more
important, this solution could also save lives.
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IX. APPENDIX: DURATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTION
ORDERS AND EXTENDED ORDERS BY STATE
JURISDICTION PROTECTION ORDER EXTENSION
DURATION DURATION
(left blank when statute
is silent)
Alabama Permanent unless otherwise
ALA. CODE § 30-5- specified.
7(d)(2).
Alaska Hybrid: one year unless dissolved
ALASKA STAT. by court order earlier. Permanent
§ 18.66.100(b). for provisions
prohibiting respondent from
threatening to commit or
committing domestic violence,
stalking, or harassment.
Arizona One year. One year.
AIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3602(K).
Arkansas Ninety days to ten years.
ARK. CODE. ANN.
§ 9-15-205(b).
California Up to five years. The failure to state Five years or
CAL. FAM. CODE an expiration date on the order permanent.
§ 6345. creates an order for three years.
Colorado Fixed period or permanent.
COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-14-102(9)(a).
Connecticut Up to six months. As the court deems




JURISDICTION PROTECTION ORDER EXTENSION
DURATION DURATION
(left blank when statute
is silent)
Delaware Hybrid: Standard order lasts up to
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. one year and up to two years for
10, § 1045(f). provisions restraining the
respondent from committing
domestic violence or from
contacting the petitioner. Order can
be permanent if aggravating
circumstances are found.




Florida Typically one year, but the court
FLA. STAT. has discretion to issue indefinite
§ 741.30(6)(c). orders.
Georgia Up to one year. Up to three years or
GA. CODE ANN. § 19- permanent.
13-4.
Hawaii Fixed period at the court's Fixed period at the
HAW. REV. STAT discretion. court's discretion.
§ 586-5.5(a).
Idaho Up to one year. Fixed period or
IDAHO CODE ANN. permanent.
§ 39-6306(5).
Illinois Up to two years. Fixed period or





Iowa Up to one year. Fixed period or
IOWA CODE ANN. permanent.
§ 236.5(2).
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JURISDICTION PROTECTION ORDER EXTENSION
DURATION DURATION
(left blank when statute
is silent)
Kansas Up to one year. Up to one year.
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3107(e).
Kentucky Up to three years. Fixed period or
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. permanent.
§ 403.725(2).
Louisiana Hybrid: Up to eighteen months;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. court may order defendant o
§ 46:2136(F). permanently refrain from abusing,
harassing, or interfering with the
petitioner.
Maine Up to two years. Fixed period or
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. permanent.
tit. 19-A, § 4007(2).
Maryland Up to one year; up to two years for
MD. CODE ANN. FAM. repeat parties.
LAW § 4-506(j).
Massachusetts Up to one year. Fixed period or
MASS. GEN. LAWS permanent.
ANN. ch. 209A, § 3.




Minnesota Up to two years except when court Up to fifty years.
MINN. STAT. ANN. determines a longer period is
§ 518B.01(6)(b). appropriate.
Mississippi Fixed period at the court's
MIss. CODE ANN. discretion.
§ 93-21-15(2)(b).




JURISDICTION PROTECTION ORDER EXTENSION
DURATION DURATION
(left blank when statute
is silent
Montana Fixed period or permanent at the






Nevada Up to one year.
NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 33.080(3).
New Hampshire Up to one year. Initial renewal for one
N.H. REV. STAT. year. Subsequent
ANN. § 173-B:5(VI). renewals for up to five
years.
New Jersey Fixed period or indefinite at the
N.J. STAT. ANN. court's discretion.
§ 2C:25-29.
New Mexico Indefinite period; only up to six Orders involving
N.M. STAT. ANN. months if custody or child support custody may be renewed
§ 40-13-6(C). is involved. once for six months.
New York Up to two years generally, or up to Fixed reasonable
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT five years upon a finding of period.
§ 842. aggravating circumstances or a
finding that the conduct alleged in
the petition is a violation of an
order of protection.
North Carolina Up to one year. Renewal for up to two
N.C. GEN. STAT. years except award of





North Dakota Not specified; to be determined at
N.D. CENT. CODE the court's discretion.
§ 14-07.1-02(4).
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JURISDICTION PROTECTION ORDER EXTENSION
DURATION DURATION
(left blank when statute
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .... _.._....._is silent)
Ohio Up to five years; however, if the Up to five years.
OHIO REV. CODE respondent is under 18 years old,
ANN. until the respondent turns 19.
§ 3113.31(E)(3)(a).
Oklahoma Five years. Fixed period or
OKLA. STAT. ANN. permanent.
tit. 22 § 60.11.
Oregon One year.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 107.716(5).
Pennsylvania Up to three years. Three years.
23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6108(d).
Rhode Island Up to three years. Fixed period or
R.I. GEN. LAWS permanent.
§ 8-8.1-3(i).
South Carolina Six months to one year.
S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-4-70(A).
South Dakota Up to five years.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 25-10-5.
Tennessee Up to one year. Typically one year. May
TENN. CODE ANN. be extended for five
§ 36-3-605(b). years for first violation
of a protection order
and ten years for
subsequent violations.
Texas Up to two years or a fixed period at
TEX. FAM. CODE the court's discretion if court finds
ANN. § 85.025(a). aggravating circumstances.
Utah Up to 150 days for civil provisions
UTAH CODE ANN. (e.g., child custody and support).
§ 78B-7-105(v), Two years for criminal provisions
106(c)(i). (e.g., no assault and no contact
provisions).
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JURISDICTION PROTECTION ORDER EXTENSION
DURATION DURATION
(left blank when statute
is silent)
Vermont Fixed period set at the court's Fixed period.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. discretion. The respondent may be
15, § 1103(c). ordered to pay petitioner's living
expenses for a period not to exceed
three months. Child support may be
ordered for a period not to exceed
three months.
Virginia Up to two years. Up to two years.
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-279.1(B).
Washington For a fixed period or permanent. Fixed period or
WASH. REV. CODE Relief restricting contact with the permanent.
ANN. § 26.50.060(2). respondent's children may only last
one year.
West Virginia Ninety to 180 days or up to one year Ninety days to one year.
W. VA. CODE ANN. with a finding of aggravating
§ 48-27-505(a). circumstances.
Wisconsin Up to four years. Up to four years.
WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.12(c)(1).
Wyoming Up to one year. Up to one year.
Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-21-106(b).
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